Do tax incentives for research increase firm innovation? An RD design for R&D by Dechezlepretre, Antoine et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1413 
March 2016 
Do Tax Incentives for Research Increase Firm 
Innovation? An RD Design for R&D 
Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Elias Einiö 
Ralf Martin, Kieu-Trang Nguyen 
John Van Reenen 
Abstract 
We present the first evidence showing causal impact of research and development (R&D) tax incentives 
on innovation outcomes. We exploit a change in the asset-based size thresholds for eligibility for R&D 
tax subsidies and implement a Regression Discontinuity Design using administrative tax data on the 
population of UK firms. There are statistically and economically significant effects of the tax change on 
both R&D and patenting, with no evidence of a decline in the quality of innovation. R&D tax price 
elasticities are large at about 2.6, probably because the treated group is from a sub-population subject to 
financial constraints. There does not appear to be pre-policy manipulation of assets around the 
thresholds that could undermine our design, but firms do adjust assets to take advantage of the subsidy 
post-policy. We estimate that over 2006-11 business R&D would be around 10% lower in the absence 
of the tax relief scheme. 
Keywords: R&D, patents, tax, innovation, Regression Discontinuity design 
JEL codes: O31; O32; H23; H25; H32 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Growth Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
The HMRC Datalab has helped immeasurably with this paper, although only the authors are 
responsible for contents. We would like to thank Steve Bond, Mike Devereux, Irem Gucerci, 
Bronwyn Hall, Pierre Mohnen and Reinhilde Veugelers for helpful comments. Participants in 
seminars at BIS, Munich, Oxford, LSE and HM Treasury have all contributed to improving the paper. 
Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council through the Centre for Economic 
Performance is gratefully acknowledged.  
Antoine Dechezleprêtre, London School of Economics and Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE. Elias Einiö, VATT and Centre for Economic Performance, London School of 
Economics. Ralf Martin, Imperial and Centre for Economic Performance, London School of 
Economics, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, London School of Economics and Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE. John Van Reenen, London School of Economics and Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE.  
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 A. Dechezleprêtre, E. Einiö, R. Martin, K.T. Nguyen and J. Van Reenen, submitted 2016. 
1 
1. Introduction
Innovation is recognized as the major source of growth in modern economies. But because 
of knowledge externalities, private returns on research and development (R&D) are typically much 
lower than their social returns, hence the need for some public subsidy.1 As a consequence, every 
country treats R&D investments more generously than capital investment, but the majority of 
OECD countries (and many developing countries) also have additional fiscal incentives such as 
enhanced deductions for R&D. Over the last two decades, these tax incentives have grown more 
popular compared to more direct R&D subsidies to firms.2 One reason for this shift is that subsi-
dizing R&D through the tax system rather than direct grants reduces administrative burden and 
mitigates the risk of “picking losers” (i.e. choosing firms with low private and social returns due 
to political connections). 
But do R&D tax incentives actually work? The existing literature has several serious short-
comings that we seek to address in this paper. First, researchers have mainly focused on the effects 
of taxes on R&D whereas the point of the policy is to try and stimulate innovation.3 The tax incen-
tive could increase observed R&D without having much effect on innovation if, for example, firms 
re-labeled existing activities as R&D to take advantage of the tax credits or only expanded very 
low quality R&D projects. We address this issue by analyzing the effect of R&D tax incentives not 
only on R&D expenditures but also on patenting activity (and other outcome measures such as 
firm size). We also look at the quality of these additional innovations through various commonly 
used measures of patent value. 
A second problem with the literature it that it has proven difficult to come up with compel-
ling causal designs to evaluate the impact of R&D tax policies. Evaluations at the macro-economic 
1 Typical results find marginal social rates of return to R&D between 30% and 50% compared to private returns 
between from 7% to 15% (Hall, Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). Endogenous growth theories (Romer 1990, Aghion 
and Howitt 1992) provide several reasons why private innovative activities do not take into account externalities over 
producers and consumers, and produce less than optimal innovations and growth. For evidence showing R&D exter-
nalities, see for example Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013). There is also evidence that these spillovers 
are partially localized geographically, so the country where the R&D is performed obtains a disproportionate share of 
the productivity benefits, at least initially.   
2 Over the period 2001-2011, R&D tax incentives were expanded in 19 out of 27 OECD countries (OECD 2014). 
3 There is a large literature on the effects of public R&D grants on firm and industry outcomes such as Einiö (2014), 
González, Jamandreu and Pazó (2005), Goodridge et al. (2015), Jaffe and Lee (2015), Lach (2002), Moretti, Stein-
wender and Van Reenen (2015) and Takalo, Tanayama, Toivanen (2013). The earlier literature is surveyed in David, 
Hall and Toole (2000).  
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(e.g. Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen, 2002; Corrado et al., 2015) or state level (Wilson, 2009; 
Moretti and Wilson, 2015) face the problem that changes of policies are likely to be coincident 
with many unobserved factors that may influence R&D. On the other hand, variation at the firm 
level is often limited as the tax rules apply to all firms and the heterogeneity in tax prices that does 
exist are driven by firm choices (e.g. R&D spending, tax exhaustion, etc.).  
To address this identification problem, we exploit a policy reform in the UK which raised 
the size threshold under which firms can access the more generous tax regime for small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SME). Importantly, the new tax threshold introduced was unique to the 
R&D tax policy so it did not overlap with access to other programs or taxes. Prior to the major 
change in 2008 the threshold was based on the European Commission definition of an SME. Given 
this change in tax thresholds, we can implement a Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design (e.g. Lee 
and Lemieux 2010) looking at differences in R&D and innovation around the new SME threshold, 
which was based on accounting data pre-dating the policy change. To assess the validity of our 
design we confirm covariate balance and the absence of bunching of the running variable (assets) 
around the threshold prior to the policy change. And we can show that there were no discontinuities 
in R&D, patents or any other outcomes in the years prior to the policy change. 
Third, data limitations have meant that the R&D tax credit literature focuses on large firms. 
Since R&D is concentrated, aggregated data will also be effectively dominated by large firms. 
Accounting regulations in most countries only insist on larger (usually public listed) firms report-
ing R&D, hence there has been a particular focus on US Compustat firms.4 But since at least Arrow 
(1962) it is recognized that financial markets may under-supply credit for R&D and these problems 
are likely to be particularly acute for SMEs.5 Hence, extrapolating from the innovation response 
of large firms to policy changes may be misleading. We use a new merged dataset containing the 
universe of UK firms. This combines confidential HMRC data (the UK equivalent of the US IRS) 
on R&D levels with firm accounts from the population of public and private firms as well as pa-
tents from 60 patent offices. The data is available before and after the R&D tax change.  
We find large effects of the R&D Tax Scheme on R&D and patents. As a result of the 
4 Rao (2014) has used US administrative tax data on the firm population to look at the impact of tax credits on R&D 
and Agrawal, Rosell and Simcoe (2014) look at the tax effect on investment for small private Canadian firms. 
5 Since R&D is mainly people, it is hard to post collateral to borrow against. Furthermore, asking outsiders for finance 
may reveal the innovation and so undermine its value.  
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policy, R&D approximately doubled in the treated firms and patenting rose by about 60% (and 
there is no evidence that these innovations were of lower value). We estimate an elasticity of R&D 
with respect to its tax-adjusted user cost of about 2.6 – higher than the values typical in the recent 
literature of between one and two.6 We argue that the higher elasticity is likely to be because the 
sub-population “randomized in” by the RD Design is composed of smaller firms than have usually 
been examined and so are more likely to be credit constrained and therefore are also more respon-
sive to R&D tax credits. We confirm this intuition by showing the response is particularly strong 
for young firms, presumably because they are more subject to credit constraints. Back of the en-
velope calculations suggest that between 2006 and 2011 the UK R&D Tax Relief Scheme induces 
£1.7 of private R&D for every £1 of taxpayer money and that aggregate UK R&D would have 
been about 16% lower in the absence of the policy. Given that we confirm the importance of pos-
itive R&D spillover effects to the innovation of neighboring firms, the policy appears to have 
succeeded in its intentions. 
In terms of the existing literature, some papers have examined the causal impact of other 
types of innovation policy on R&D and other outcomes. These have used ratings given to grant 
applications as a way of generating exogenous variation around funding thresholds. Jacob and 
Lefgren (2010) and Azoulay et al. (2014) examine the impact of NIH grants. Bronzini and Iachini 
(2014) and Bronzini and Piselli (2014) use an RD Design for R&D subsidies in Italy.7 Probably 
closest to our paper is Howell (2015) who uses the ranking of SBIR proposals for energy R&D. 
She finds significant effects of subsidies on future venture capital funding, especially for small 
firms.8 Some papers have looked at the impact of R&D tax credits on non-R&D outcomes without 
an RD Design. For example, Bøler, Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2015) employ a difference-in-dif-
ferences strategy to investigate how the introduction of R&D tax credit in Norway affects profits, 
intermediate imports and R&D.9 
6 See surveys by Becker (2015), OECD (2013) or Hall and Van Reenen (2000). 
7 The authors look at the impacts of R&D subsidies on investment and patents in Northern Italy in an RD Design (they 
do not have R&D data). In their setting the running variable is determined on the basis of scoring the project applica-
tions by a committee of experts. They observe a discontinuity in the score distribution around the eligibility cut-off, 
which they interpret as a sign of programme managers being able to assign higher scores for projects just below the 
cut-off to avoid appeals. 
8 She also finds effects on patents, but not on citations from Phase 1 funding. 
9 See also Czarnitki, Hanel, and Rosa (2011), Cappelen, Raknerud, and Rybalka (2012) and Bérubé and Mohnen 
(2009) who look at the effects of R&D tax credits on patents and/or new products. Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) 
examine Research Joint Ventures and patents. 
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Our paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of R&D on innovation (e.g. Hall, 
Mairesse, and Mohnen, 2010). We find that R&D has a positive causal effect on innovation, with 
elasticities that are underestimated in conventional OLS approaches. More broadly, we provide 
evidence on the role of tax on a particular kind of investment (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Hassett 
and Hubbard, 2002).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the institutional setting of the tax relief 
policy; Section 3 explains the empirical design; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 presents 
the main results and Section 6 some extensions. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Institutional setting
We give more details of the institutional setting and tax policies in Appendix A (Table A1 
details the policy changes over time), but summarize the most important features in this section. 
From the early 1980s the UK business R&D to GDP ratio fell, whereas it rose in most other OECD 
countries. In 2000, an R&D Tax Relief Scheme was introduced for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). It was extended to cover large companies in 2002, even though SMEs continued to enjoy 
more generous R&D tax relief. The policy costs the UK government £1.4bn in 2013 alone 
(Fowkes, Sousa and Duncan, 2015).  
The tax policy is based on the total amount of R&D, i.e. it is volume-based rather than 
calculated as an increment over past spending like the US R&D tax credit. It works mostly through 
enhanced deduction of R&D from taxable income, thus reducing corporate tax liabilities. Only 
current R&D expenditures, such as labor and materials, qualify for the scheme, but since capital 
only accounts for about 10% of total R&D, this is less important (e.g. Cameron, 1996). At the time 
of its introduction, the scheme allowed SMEs to deduct an additional 50% of qualifying R&D 
expenditure from taxable profits (on top of the 100% that applies to any form of current expendi-
ture). If an SME was not making profits, it could surrender enhanced losses in return for a payable 
tax credit10 amounting to 16% of enhanced R&D.11 This design feature was aimed at dealing with 
the well-known problem that smaller companies may not be making enough profits to benefit from 
10 Throughout we will use “tax credit” to refer to this refundable element of the scheme as distinct from the “enhance-
ment” element. 
11 Or equivalently, 24% (=16% x 150%) of total R&D expenditure. See Finance Act 2000 (Chapter 17, Schedule 20). 
5 
the enhancement rate. Large companies had a less generous deduction rate of 25% of their R&D 
and could not claim the refundable tax credits in the case of losses (Finance Act, 2002). The refund-
able aspect of the scheme is particularly beneficial to firms who are liquidity constrained and we 
will present evidence in line with the idea that the large responses we observe are related to the 
alleviation of financial constraints.
Aggregate business R&D intensity stabilized after the introduction of this R&D tax policy 
and Bond and Guceri (2012) suggest that these are causally connected. Guceri (2015) uses a dif-
ference-in-differences method across firm size classes to look at the effect of the introduction of 
the program and argues that the policy raised R&D by 20% in the affected firms. Fowkes et al. 
(2015) calculate the firm-specific user cost and instrument this with lagged values, also finding 
positive effects on R&D.  
The policy used the SME definition recommended by the European Commission (EC) 
throughout most of the 2000s. This definition was based on employment, total assets, and sales12 
from the last two accounting years. It also takes into consideration company ownership structure 
and constrains variation in the SME status over time by requiring that in order to change its SME 
status, a company must fall in the new category two consecutive accounting periods (two-year 
rule). If a firm is below the threshold in year t, it must be above the threshold in both years t+1 
and t+2 to lose its SME status in year t+2. Otherwise, it remains an SME in both subsequent years 
as it has been in year t.13  
We focus on the major change to the scheme that commenced from August 2008. The SME 
assets threshold was increased from €43m to €86m, the employment threshold from 249 to 499 
and the sales threshold from €50m to €100m.14 As a result of these changes, a substantial propor-
tion of companies that were eligible for the large company rate according to the old definition 
became eligible for the SME rate. In addition to the change in SME definition, the UK government 
also increased the enhancement rate for both SMEs and large companies in the same year. The 
12 We use the terms “sales”, “turnover” and “revenue” interchangeably in the paper, except when more precise defini-
tions are needed. 
13 For further details of the EC criteria see Recommendations 1996/280/EC and 2003/361/EC, summarized in Appen-
dix A1.  
14 The other criteria laid down in the EC 2003 recommendation (e.g. two-year rule) were maintained in the new pro-
vision in Finance Act 2007 (Chapter 11). This act did not appoint a date on which new ceilings became effective. The 
date was appointed in the Finance Act 2007, Section 50 (Appointed Day) Order 2008 of July 16th 2008. 
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SME enhancement rate increased from 50% to 75%.15 For large companies, the rate changed from 
25% to 30%. The policy change implies a reduction in the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D from 
0.19 to 0.15 for the newly-eligible SMEs whereas the user cost for large companies was basically 
unchanged (see sub-section 5.2 below and Table A11). 
We examine the impact of this jump in tax-adjusted user cost of R&D at the new SME 
thresholds. The advantage of employing this reform instead of the other changes in the SME defi-
nition is twofold. First, unlike the previous thresholds based on the EU definition, which were 
extensively used in many other support programs targeting SMEs, the thresholds introduced in 
2008 were specific to the R&D Tax Relief Scheme. This allows us to recover the effects of the 
R&D Tax Relief Scheme without confounding them with the impact of other SME schemes. Sec-
ond, identifying the impacts around newly introduced thresholds mitigates biases arising from tax 
planning of R&D intensive firms which may cause endogenous bunching of firms around the 
thresholds. We show that firms did respond rationally by starting to bunch around the new thresh-
olds in 2009 and afterwards. But we also demonstrate that there was no bunching around the 
threshold in 2007 (or earlier) and covariates were all balanced at the cutoff. This is important as 
although the policy was not completely detailed until July 2008 (and implemented in August 2008), 
aspects of the policy were understood in 2007 so firms may in principle have responded in advance. 
Information frictions, adjustment costs and policy uncertainty mean that this adjustment is likely 
to be sluggish, especially for the SMEs we study here.16  
We will focus on assets as our key running variable. This is one of the three determinants 
of SME status and, unlike employment and sales, it does not suffer from missing values. We dis-
cuss this in detail in Section 4 and also consider using employment and sales in sub-section 6.4. 
We use the 2007 value of assets as this will matter for SME tax status in 2009 which depends on 
the past two accounting years as discussed above. Since the policy only began mid-way through 
2008, it is inappropriate to use values in 2008 as a running variable. Nevertheless, we examine 
what happens when we consider other years for the running variable in robustness tests. 
15 In parallel, the SME payable credit rate was reduced to 14% of enhanced R&D expenditure (i.e. 24.5% of R&D 
expenditure) to ensure that R&D tax credit falls below the 25% limit for state aid.  
16 Sluggish adjustment to policy announcements is consistent with many papers in the public finance literature (e.g. 
Kleven and Waseem, 2013). 
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3. Empirical strategy
We start with a simple R&D equation: 
𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑆,𝑡𝐸𝑖,2007 + 𝑓1,𝑡(𝑧𝑖,2007) + 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡          (1) 
where t = 2009, 2010, 2011 and 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡 is an error term.  𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is R&D the expenditure of firm i in 
year t and 𝐸𝑖,2007 = 𝐼{ 𝑧𝑖,2007 ≤ ?̃? } is a binary indicator equal to one if assets in 2007 ( ) is 
equal to or less than the corresponding new SME threshold, ?̃?. The coefficient of interest 𝛽𝐹𝑆 esti-
mates the effect of the difference in tax relief schemes between SMEs and large firms on firms’ 
R&D spending. In an RD Design framework, the identification assumption requires that the dis-
tribution of all predetermined variables is smooth around the threshold, which is testable on ob-
servables. The identification is guaranteed when firms cannot manipulate their running variable, 
𝑧𝑖,2007 (Lee, 2008). Under this assumption, eligibility, 𝐸𝑖,2007, is as good as randomly assigned at 
the cutoff. We consider year by year regressions of equation (1) as well as averaging over three 
post-policy years. 
Equation (1) can be derived from the static first order condition of a firm with an R&D 
augmented CES production function (see Appendix A). We show how the elasticity of R&D with 
respect to its user cost can be derived in Section 5 below. 
As is standard in RD Designs, we control for separate polynomials of the running variable 
on both sides of the assets threshold of €86m.17 As noted above, because of the two-year rule, a 
firm’s SME status in 2009 is partly based on its financials in 2007. These are unlikely to be ma-
nipulated by firms for tax planning purpose since the start date of the new SME definition (August 
1st 2008) was only announced on July 16th 2008.18 Using total assets in 2007 as our primary running 
variable thus mitigates the concern that there may have been endogenous sorting of firms across 
the threshold. Nevertheless, since there were discussions of the change in thresholds in late 2006 
we are careful to check for continuity of observables around the thresholds even in 2007. 
Notice that the “new SMEs”, i.e. those who became SMEs only under the new definition, 
17 We also follow Gelman and Imbens’s (2014) warning against using higher order polynomials, especially when 
higher order coefficients are not significant. We show in robustness checks that including higher order polynomials 
produce qualitatively similar results across all specifications. 
18 Finance Act 2007, Section 50 (Appointed Day) Order 2008 of July 16th 2008. 
,2007iz
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could only obtain the higher tax deduction rates on R&D performed after August 2008. Hence, to 
the extent that firms could predict the change in thresholds in early 2008 (or they could manipulate 
the reported timing of within year R&D), such companies would have an incentive to reduce 2008 
R&D expenditures before August and increase them afterwards. To avoid these complexities with 
the transition year of 2008, we focus on 2009 and afterwards as full post-policy years. 
Figure 1 shows that the distribution of firms’ 2007 assets appears continuous around the 
new 2008 SME threshold of €86m. The McCrary test gives a discontinuity estimate (log difference 
in density height at the SME threshold) of -0.026 with a standard error of 0.088, which is close to 
and not significantly different from zero. Sub-section 6.3 discusses how there is also continuity in 
earlier years, but how this changes in later years in response to the policy switch. 
In terms of innovative outputs we consider the following patent equation analogous to the 
R&D equation (1): 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼2,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑅𝐹,𝑡𝐸𝑖,2007 + 𝑓2,𝑡(𝑧𝑖,2007) +  𝜀2𝑖,𝑡   (2) 
where the dependent variable is the number of patents, 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 . Under the same identification as-
sumptions discussed above, 𝛽𝑅𝐹 estimates the causal effect of the policy on patents.  
Finally we consider the “structural” patents equation: 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼3,𝑡 +  𝛾3,𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓3,𝑡(𝑧𝑖,2007) +  𝜀3𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
which can interpreted as a “knowledge production function” as introduced by Griliches (1979). 
Equations (1) and (3) correspond to a fuzzy RD model identifying the impact of additional R&D 
spending induced by the difference in tax relief schemes on firms’ innovation output, using 𝐸𝑖,2007 
as the instrument for R&D. With homogenous treatment effects, IV delivers the causal effect of 
R&D on patents under the exclusion restriction that the threshold indicator 𝐸𝑖,2007 does not affect 
innovation outputs through any other channel. With heterogeneous treatment effects, IV requires 
a monotonicity assumption that moving a firm’s size slightly below the threshold always increases 
R&D. In this case,  𝛾3 is the Average Causal Response (Angrist and Imbens 1995), a generalization 
of the Local Average Treatment Effect that averages (with weights) over firms’ causal responses 
of innovation outputs to small changes in R&D spending due to the IV.  
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4. Data
4.1 Data sources 
Our data comes from three main sources: (1) HMRC Corporate Tax returns (CT600) and 
its extension, the Research and Development Tax Credits (RDTC) dataset, which provide data on 
the universe of UK firms and importantly includes firm’s R&D expenditures as claimed under the 
R&D Tax Relief Scheme, (2) Bureau Van Dijk’s FAME company dataset which provides data on 
the accounts of the universe of incorporated firms, and (3) PATSTAT which has patent information 
on all patents filed by UK companies in the main 60 patent offices across the world. 
CT600 is a confidential administrative panel dataset provided by HMRC Datalab (the UK 
IRS) which consists of tax assessments made from the returns for all UK companies liable for 
corporation tax. It is made accessible to researchers only since 2011 and ours is among the first 
papers to use this dataset. The dataset covers financial years 2000-01 to 2011-1219, with close to 
16 million firm by year observations, and contains all information provided by firms in their annual 
corporate tax returns. We are specifically interested in CT600’s RDTC Tax Credits dataset, which 
consists of all information related to the R&D Tax Relief Scheme including the amount of quali-
fying R&D expenditure each firm has in a year and the scheme under which it makes the claim 
(SME vs. Large Company Scheme). 
Firms made a total of 53,000 claims between 2006 and 2011 (22,000 claims over 2006-08 
and 31,000 claims over 2009-11), about 80% of which are under the SME Scheme. Total claims 
amounted to £2.5bn in R&D tax relief in total between 2006 and 2008 and £3.3bn between 2009 
and 2011.20  
We only observe R&D when firms seek to claim R&D tax relief and all the firms in the 
sample are eligible for some sort of R&D tax relief (it is just that the generosity differs depending 
on size). Ideally, we would also use R&D data from other sources, but UK accounting regulations 
(like the US regulation of privately listed firms) do not insist on SMEs reporting their R&D, so 
19 The UK fiscal year runs from April 1st to March 31st so 2001-02 refers to data between April 1st 2001 and March 
31st 2002. In the text we refer to the financial years by their first year, so 2011-2012 is denoted “2011”. 
20 It is currently not possible to merge CT600 with the BERD firm survey which is used to build the national estimate 
of R&D. The BERD survey (like US BERDIS) is a stratified random sample with very partial coverage of SMEs, 
however, so there would again be partial coverage. 
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there are many missing values. Statistics provided by internal HMRC analysis indicate that quali-
fying R&D expenditure amounts to 70% of total business R&D (BERD).21 Note that the other 
outcomes (like patents) are observed for all firms, regardless of R&D status.  
CT600 makes it possible to determine the SME status of firms who claim the R&D tax 
relief, but not the SME status of firms who are not claiming (the vast majority of firms). Employ-
ment and total assets are not available because such information is not directly required on corpo-
rate tax forms. Furthermore, only tax-accounting sales is reported in CT600, while the SME defi-
nition is based on financial-accounting sales as reported in company accounts.22 Consequently, we 
turn to a second dataset, FAME, which contains all UK company accounts since about the mid-
1980s. We match CT600 to FAME by an HMRC-anonymized version of company registration 
number (CRN), which is a unique regulatory identifier in both datasets. We merged 95% of CT600 
firms between 2006 and 2011 with FAME and these firms cover close to 100% of R&D performing 
firms and patenting firms. Unmatched firms are slightly smaller but not statistically different from 
matched ones across different variables reported in CT600, including sales, gross trading profits, 
and gross and net corporate tax chargeable (see Appendix B4).  
All firms are required to report their total assets in company accounts, but reporting of 
revenues and employment is mandatory only for larger firms. In our 2006 to 2011 FAME sample, 
only 5% of firms reported employment and only 15% reported sales. By comparison 97% reported 
assets. Even in our baseline sample of relatively larger firms around the SME asset threshold of 
€86m, employment and sales coverage is still only reported by 55% and 67% of firms respectively. 
For this reason, we only focus on exploiting the SME asset threshold with respect to total assets 
and use this as the key running variable in our baseline specification. Financial variables are re-
ported in sterling while the SME thresholds are set in euros, so we convert assets and sales using 
exactly the same tax rules used by HMRC for this purpose. In addition, FAME provides industry, 
location, capital investment, profits, remuneration, etc., though coverage differs across variables.  
We use assets from FAME as our key running variable, but also experiment with using 
21 There are various reasons for this difference, including the fact that BERD includes R&D spending on capital 
investment whereas qualified R&D does not (only current expenses are liable). It is also the case that HMRC defines 
R&D more narrowly for tax purposes that BERD which is based on the Frascati definition. 
22 Tax-accounting sales turnover is calculated using the cash-based method, which focuses on actual cash receipts 
rather than their related sale transactions. Financial-accounting turnover is calculated using the accrual method, which 
records sale revenues when they are earned, regardless of whether cash from sales has been collected.   
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sales to determine SME status, despite the greater number of missing values. In principle, using 
both running variables should increase efficiency, but in practice (as we explain in sub-section 6.4) 
it buys us less than what we hoped for. There are too many missing values on employment to use 
this as an alternative running variable. Note that these are all efficiency issue. The fact that we use 
only one of the three criteria for determining eligibility does not violate the assumptions for RD 
Design, it just reduces the precision of our estimates (and changes the interpretation of the estimate 
in the heterogeneous treatment model).  
The third dataset we exploit is PATSTAT, a database curated by the European Patent Office 
(EPO). PATSTAT is the largest available international patent database and covers close to the pop-
ulation of all worldwide patents since the 1980s. It brings together nearly 70 million patent docu-
ments from over 60 patent offices, including all of the major offices such as the European Patent 
Office, the United States Patent and Trademark office (USPTO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO). 
Patents filed with the UK Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) are also included. To assign pa-
tents to UK-based companies we use the matching between PATSTAT and FAME implemented by 
Bureau Van Dijk and available from the ORBIS database. The quality of the matching is excellent: 
over our sample period, 94% of patents filed in the UK and 96% of patents filed at the EPO have 
been successfully associated with their owning company. We select all patents filed by UK com-
panies between 1980 and 2013.23 Our dataset contains comprehensive information from the patent 
record, including application date, citations, and technology class. Importantly, PATSTAT includes 
information on patent families, which are sets of patents protecting the same invention across sev-
eral jurisdictions. This allows us to identify all patent applications filed worldwide by UK-based 
companies and to avoid double-counting inventions that are protected in several countries.24 
In our baseline results, we use the number of patent families – irrespective of where the 
patents are filed – as a measure of the number of inventions for which patent protection has been 
sought. This means that we count the number of patents filed anywhere in the world by firms in 
our sample, whether at the UK, European or US patent office, but we use information on patent 
23 To avoid double counting, a patent filed by more than one firm is distributed equally among the firms. For example, 
a patent filed by 2 firms is counted as 0.5 for each of the firms. 
24 This means that thanks to patent family information our dataset includes patents filed by foreign affiliates of UK 
companies overseas that relate to an invention filed by the UK-based mother company. However, patents filed inde-
pendently by foreign affiliates of UK companies overseas are not included. 
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families to make sure that an invention patented in multiple jurisdictions is only counted once. 
Patents are sorted by application year. Our measures use all patent application to avoid artificially 
truncating the sample, as the granting of a patent is a long administrative process (3.3 years on 
average in the UK, see Dechezleprêtre, 2013).  
Numerous studies have demonstrated a strong link between patenting and firm perfor-
mance.25 Nevertheless, patents have their limitations (e.g. Hall et al., 2013). To tackle the problem 
that the value of individual patents is highly heterogeneous, we (i) show results separately for high 
value EPO patents vs. UK patents, (ii) use data on patent families and (iii) weight by patent cita-
tions. It has been demonstrated that the number of countries in which a patent is filed and the 
number of citations received by a patent in subsequent patents are both correlated with other indi-
cators of patent value.26 
4.2 Baseline sample descriptive statistics 
We construct our baseline sample from the above three datasets. Our baseline sample con-
tains 5,888 firms with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m which survive27 at least until 
2008 based on a €25m bandwidth around the threshold, with 3,651 firms under the €86m SME 
asset threshold and 2,327 firms above the threshold. The bandwidth of €25m is somewhat arbitrary, 
so we show robustness to a range of alternative bandwidths.28 Our key outcome variables include 
amount of qualifying R&D expenditure, and number of patents filed. All nominal variables are 
converted to 2007 price using the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI), and all outcome variables are 
winsorized at 2.5% of non-zero values to mitigate the leverage of outliers.29 In 2006-08 224 of 
these firms had positive R&D and this number rose to 254 over 2009-11 (roughly 5% of aggregate 
R&D expenditure). 210 firms filed 327 patents over 2006-08, and 157 firms filed 285 patents over 
2009-11.     
25 For example, see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) on US firms or Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) on 
UK firms. 
26  Lanjouw et al. (1998), Harhoff et al. (2003), Squicciarini et al. (2013), Hall et al. (2005), Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2004). 
27 Firms who die are kept in the sample to avoid selection bias, but are given zero R&D. 
28 The Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) optimal bandwidth for using R&D as the outcome variable is 22, which is 
close to our baseline choice of 25. 
29 This is equivalent to “winsorizing” the R&D of the top 5 to 6 R&D spenders and the number of patents of the top 2 
to 4 patenters in the baseline sample each year. We also show robustness to excluding outliers instead of winsorizing 
outcome variables. 
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In the 2006-2008 period firms below the threshold spent on average £57,800 per annum on 
R&D and firms above the threshold spent an average of £94,500 (with an overall average of 
£72,300). After the policy between 2009 and 2011 these numbers changed to £72,000 and £93,600. 
In other words, the gap in R&D spending between the two groups of firms almost halved from 
£36,700 pre-policy to £21,600 post-policy. In terms of innovation outputs, the average number of 
patents per annum was similar between the two groups of firms before the policy change (0.06), 
while after the policy change, firms below the SME asset threshold filed 30% more patents than 
those above the threshold (0.06 vs. 0.04). Detailed descriptive statistics by year across the two 
groups are in Table 1. 
These “difference in differences” estimates are consistent with our hypothesis that the 2008 
policy change induces firms below the new SME asset threshold, which are more likely to benefit 
from more generous tax relief under the SME scheme, to increase their R&D and patents. Gureci 
(2015) and Guceri and Li (2015) come to the same conclusion using a difference in difference 
approach.30 However, there could be differential time trends correlated with size which could con-
found these simple comparisons between smaller and larger firms. We now turn to implementing 
the RD Design of equations (1)-(3) to investigate the causal effects directly. 
5. Results
5.1 Main results 
Table 2 reports R&D regressions (equation (1)). The key explanatory variable is whether 
the firm’s total assets in 2007 was below the new SME asset threshold of €86m. The sample is 
limited to firms with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m (a €25m bandwidth around the 
threshold), and the running variable is the firms’ total assets in 2007. Looking at each of the three 
“pre-policy” years 2006-2008 in columns (1) to (3), we find that as expected there is no significant 
discontinuity in R&D at the asset threshold before the new SME definition became effective to-
ward the end of 2008.31 In the next three columns we observe that from 2009 onward, firms just 
30 Unlike our paper they look only at R&D, however, and not patents or other firm performance outcomes. Further-
more, they condition on R&D performing firms which (i) creates selection issues and (ii) means that they cannot look 
at the extensive margin (i.e. they cannot examine whether any firms start or stop performing R&D as a result of the 
tax changes). 
31 The point estimate of 32 in 2008 is a third smaller than in 2007 (although both are insignificant). This could be 
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below the SME threshold have significantly more R&D than firms just above the threshold. Col-
umn (7) averages the three pre-policy years and column (8) the three post policy years. The dis-
continuity implies a causal annual effect of £138,500 per firm, compared to an insignificant effect 
pre-policy. Column (9) presents the difference between columns (8) and (7) and even in this spec-
ification there is a causal effect of £75,300. Although formally, the absence of a pre-policy trend 
implies that we do not need to take account of the trend, we consider this a conservative approach.32 
An effect of £75,300 per annum about doubles the average R&D per annum observed in the pre-
policy period (£72,300), suggesting that the policy had a substantial impact from an economic as 
well as statistical perspective.  
Figure 2 shows visually the discontinuous jumps in R&D at the SME asset threshold of 
€86m. While total assets correlate positively with both outcome variables in the regions just above 
and just below the threshold, as shown by the upward sloping regression lines, right across the 
threshold, there is a sudden jump in R&D expenditure. The size of the jump corresponds to the 
estimate in column (8) of Table 2 and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Table 3 directly checks our RD identification assumption by looking at covariate balance. 
Firms right below and above the threshold are similar to one another in their observable character-
istics prior to the policy change. The differences in sales, capital, and employment between the 
two groups of firms in 2006 and 2007 are both small and statistically insignificant in columns (1) 
through (6). After the policy change, we should not observe any discontinuity in R&D around any 
asset threshold other than the true SME asset threshold of €86m. To test this we ran a series of 
placebo tests on “pseudo” thresholds and found no significant effects. In column (7) we use a lower 
threshold of €71m with as an upper bound the true threshold of €86m and as a lower bound €46m 
(€25m below the lower pseudo-threshold as in the baseline). In column (8) we use a higher thresh-
old of €101m with as a lower bound the true threshold of €86m and as an upper bound €116m 
(€25m above the higher pseudo-threshold). Neither experiment yield statistically significant ef-
fects. We also run similar placebo tests using all possible integer “pseudo” thresholds between 
because firms were delaying their R&D in the start of 2008 (before the R&D threshold was changed) to the latter part 
of 2008 or even 2009. The fact that the policy effect in 2010 and 2011 are larger than 2009 makes this somewhat 
unlikely, but does highlight the difficulty of interpreting the 2008 data (which is another reason for using 2007 as the 
running variable). 
32 Alternatively we can condition directly on lagged R&D in the regressions. In Table A3, column (4) shows that we 
obtain treatment effects (standard error) of £82,000 (36,400) when we do this over the 2009-11 period. 
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€71m and €101m with a bandwidth of €25m as in the baseline specification (we allow the true 
threshold of €86m to be included in some samples in this experiment). Figure A1, which plots the 
resulting coefficients and their 95% confidence interval against the corresponding thresholds, 
shows that the estimated discontinuities in R&D peaks at the true threshold of €86m, while they 
are almost not statistically different from zero anywhere else.   
Our results are robust to a wide range of robustness tests (see Table A3). We follow Gelman 
and Imbens’ (2014) advice in using a first order polynomial for the running variable, especially as 
higher order terms are insignificant. If we add a second order polynomial to the baseline specifi-
cation of column (8) in Table 2, the treatment effect (standard error) is larger at 171.2 (87.4) and 
the coefficient (standard error) on the first and second order assets terms are 0.1 (0.6) and 0.3 
(0.7).33 Second, the discontinuity is also robust to adding lagged dependent variable controls, in-
dustry and/or location fixed effects.34 Third, we obtain statistically significant effects of compara-
ble magnitude when using a Poisson specification instead of OLS.35 Fourth, the discontinuity re-
mains significant when we narrow the sample bandwidth or when we give more weights to firms 
closer to the asset threshold.36 Finally, our estimates are robust to the choice of winsorization. 
Table 4 reports the patent regressions (equation (2)) using the same specification and sam-
ple as Table 2. As with R&D, the first three columns show no significant discontinuity around the 
threshold for patenting activity prior to the policy 2006-08. By contrast, there is a significant in-
crease in patenting in the post-policy period from 2009 onward (columns (3) to (6)). According to 
column (8) there is a significant average increase of 0.073 patents per year per firm as a result of 
the policy. The coefficient for the pre-policy period is half the size and statistically insignificant 
(column (7)). If we use the before and after differences, this is still significant at 0.035, and is a 
33 If we add a third order polynomial the treatment effect rises further to 175.3, but is no longer statistically significant. 
The F-test on joint significance of the four higher order terms, however, is 1.05 (corresponding p-value of 0.38), 
suggesting they are not needed (they are all individually insignificant as well). 
34 Adding R&D in 2007 or average R&D over 2006-08 as a control variable gives coefficients (standard error) of 75.5 
(37.6) and 82.0 (36.4) respectively, similar to result from the baseline after-before design. Adding industry (4-digit 
SIC) fixed effects or location (2-digit postcode) fixed effects gives coefficients (standard errors) of 125.6 (61.2) and 
107.4 (49.5) respectively. 
35 We do this to allow for a proportionate effect on R&D (as in a semi-log specification). Using Poisson specification 
gives treatment effects (standard errors) of 1.62 (0.57) without lagged dependent variable control and 1.08 (0.54) when 
controlling for R&D in 2007. This is similar to the proportionate effects in Table 2. 
36 Using bandwidths of €35m or €15m gives coefficients (standard errors) of 43.6 (43.5) and 182.0 (73.5) respectively. 
Using Epanechnikov-kernel weights or triangular-kernel weights gives coefficients (standard errors) of 148.6 (57.8) 
and 151.9 (60.8). 
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substantial increase over the pre-policy sample mean of 0.060 (i.e. 58% more patents). This is a 
key result, as the R&D policy was not based on patents, so there is no danger similar to the case 
of relabeling existing activities as research. It may be surprising that the patent response is so 
speedy, but patent applications are usually timed quite closely to research expenditures in most 
sectors (e.g. Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). 
Figure 3 illustrates the discontinuity in the total number of patents filed over 2009-11 at 
the SME asset threshold of €86m, which corresponds to the estimate column (8) of Table 4. As 
with R&D there is clear evidence of the discontinuity in innovation outcomes at directly the point 
of the tax threshold. Furthermore, “pseudo” threshold tests similar to those discussed in Table 3 
show that the estimated discontinuities in patent counts peak at the real SME threshold of €86m 
and are not statistically different from zero elsewhere (Figure A2). 
We ran all the robustness tests discussed for the R&D equation also on the patent regres-
sions (see Table A4), including adding higher order polynomials of the running variables, lagged 
dependent variables, industry and location controls, using the Poisson specification, widening or 
narrowing the sample bandwidth, giving more weights to firms closer to the SME asset threshold, 
changing the winsorization parameter, etc. The results were robust.37 
As patents vary widely in quality, one important concern is that the additional patents in-
duced by the policy could be of lower value. Table 5 investigates this possibility by considering 
different ways to control for quality. Column (1) reproduces our baseline results of patent counts. 
Column (2) counts only patents that are filed at the European Patent Office (EPO). It is around six 
times more costly to file a patent at the EPO than just at the UK patent office.38 Consequently, 
EPO patents are likely to be of higher value – only about a third of firms who filed UK patents in 
our sample also filed at the EPO. It is clear that there is a significant and positive effect on these 
high value patents and on the lower value patents filed in the UK (but not necessarily elsewhere) 
37 Adding patents in 2007 or average patents over 2006-08 as a control variable gives coefficients (standard errors) of 
0.041 (0.021) and 0.043 (0.018) respectively, similar to result from the baseline after-before design. Adding industry 
(4-digit SIC) fixed effects or location (2-digit postcode) fixed effects gives coefficients (standard errors) of 0.069 
(0.035) and 0.075 (0.027) respectively. Using Poisson specification gives treatment effect (standard errors) of 1.52 
(0.50). Using bandwidths of €35m or €15m gives coefficients (standard errors) of 0.045 (0.025) and 0.071 (0.049) 
respectively. Using Epanechnikov-kernel weights or triangular-kernel weights gives coefficients (standard errors) of 
0.071 (0.027) and 0.070 (0.029). 
38 Filing a patent at the European Patent Office costs around €30,000 (Roland Berger, 2005). In contrast, filing a patent 
at the UK IPO costs £3,000 to £5,000 (i.e. €4,000 to €6,000).  
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as shown in column (3). Although the point estimate is larger for UK patents than EPO patents 
(0.094 vs. 0.37), so is the mean (see base of the column), so the proportionate increase in patents 
is by a factor of about 1.2 in both columns (0.037/0.031 and 0.094/0.077).  
As an alternative measure of patent value, we use data on family size, i.e. we count the 
number of jurisdictions in which each invention is patented (see Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 
1998). Since firms have to bear administrative costs for taking out intellectual protection in each 
country, the larger the family size, the more valuable the patent is likely to be (Harhoff et al., 2003). 
Compared to citations (see below), an advantage of patent family as a quality indicator is that all 
patent applications of the same invention need to be filed within (at most) 30 months after the first 
filing date. Hence, information on family size is available more quickly than patent citations.  Col-
umn (4) of Table 5 uses this measure as a dependent variable and again finds a significant causal 
effect, showing almost a doubling of patenting activity.39  
Concerns have been raised, especially in the US, that many patents are of dubious value 
and standards have slackened (e.g. business processing methods like Amazon’s “one click” patent). 
It is generally agreed though, that patents in chemicals (such as biotechnology or pharmaceutical 
patents) remain of high value. Consequently, column (5) looks at chemical patents as an outcome 
and column (6) at non-chemical patents. Both dependent variables show a positive and significant 
effect of the policy with proportionate effects which are, if anything, larger in the “high quality” 
chemical patent sector.40  
Finally, counting citations made by subsequent patents are a popular method of accounting 
for patent value (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Hall et al., 2005). If we weight EPO patents 
by future citations we obtain a coefficient (standard error) of 0.004 (0.002) as shown in column 
(7) of Table 5. In column (8), the UK measures are similar in proportionate terms, but insignificant 
at conventional levels. 41 However, we need to keep in mind that our data is very recent. For ex-
ample, patents applied for in 2011 will have been published in 2012 or 2013 and hence will have 
39 We also look at average family size per patent as a measure of patent value (we assign average family size value of 
zero to firms with no patents). The resulting coefficient (standard error) of 0.0038 (0.0314) is also positive, although 
not statistically significant. 
40 If we narrow the outcome still further to only bio-pharmaceutical patents the coefficient (standard error) is even 
larger in proportionate terms: 0.013 (0.006) on a pre-policy mean of 0.005. 
41 The coefficients (standard errors) obtained when we weight UK patents or all patents by future citations are 0.023 
(0.021) and 0.012 (0.012) respectively. We also look at average citations per patent as a measure of patent value (again, 
we assign average citations value of zero to firms with no patents). This gives coefficients (standard errors) of 0.0010 
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had very little time to be cited.42 
In summary, there is no strong evidence from Table 5 of any fall in innovation quality as a 
result of the policy. 
Table 6 reports IV patents regressions where the key right hand side variable, R&D, is 
instrumented by the discontinuity in the tax threshold.43 Column (1) presents the OLS version 
which shows a positive association between patents and R&D. Column (2) presents the IV results 
which increases the coefficient substantially (although the two estimates are not statistically dif-
ferent on the basis of the Hausman test presented at the base of the column). The IV estimate 
implies that one additional patent costs on average £1.9m (= 1/0.53) in additional qualifying R&D 
expenditure. Columns (3) and (4) show OLS and IV results for EPO and the final two for UK 
patents. All have significant effects, though larger for IV than OLS. The corresponding costs for 
one additional UK patent or one additional EPO patent is £1.5m and £3.7m respectively (columns 
(4) and (6)), which reflects that fact that only inventions of higher value typically get patented at 
the EPO. These figures are broadly in line with the existing estimates for R&D costs per patent of 
$1m to $5m.44 We again subject these IV regression to the robustness tests discussed for the first 
stage and reduced form regressions to show that the magnitudes are robust (Table A5).  
5.2 Magnitudes and tax-price elasticities 
What is the implied elasticity of R&D with respect to its tax-adjusted user cost? Following 
the existing literature,45 we define the elasticity as the percentage increase in R&D capital with 
respect to the percentage increase in the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital. In our setting, the 




(0.0010) for EPO patents and -0.0015 (0.0028) for UK patents. Both estimates are statistically insignificant.   
42 Patents are published 18 months after the application date. 
43 In the corresponding IV model, the estimate of the first-stage effect of the instrument on R&D is the coefficient on 
the threshold dummy in column (8) of Table 2. 
44 Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen (2008); Gurmu and Pérez-Sebastián (2008); Dernis et al. 
(2015). 
45 For example, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) or Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002). 
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where 𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸 and 𝑟𝑑𝐿𝐶𝑂 are the R&D of a firm under the SME scheme and under the large com-
panies (“LCO”) scheme respectively,46 and 𝜌𝑆𝑀𝐸  and 𝑝𝐿𝐶𝑂 are the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D
facing the firm faces under the corresponding schemes.  
Table 2 column (9) generates a treatment effect of £75,300, about a doubling over the pre-
policy average R&D of £72,300.47 Using these figures for our baseline tax-price elasticity calcu-
lation gives us a log difference in R&D of ln(𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑀𝐸) − ln(𝑟𝑑𝐿𝐶𝑂) = ln(75.3 + 72.3) −
ln(72.3) = 0.71.48 We calculate the tax-adjusted user cost, 𝜌𝑓, based on the actual design of the




(𝑟 + 𝛿) 
where sub-script f denotes whether the firm is an SME or larger firm, 𝐴 is the value of R&D tax 
relief, 𝜏 is the effective corporate tax rate, 𝑟 is the real interest rate and 𝛿 is the depreciation rate. 
As described in Section 2, the R&D Tax Relief Scheme includes a tax deduction feature for firms 
with corporate tax liability with different enhancement rates under the SME and large company 
schemes and a payable tax credit feature for firms with no corporate tax liability only under the 
SME scheme.49 In the case of tax deduction, the value of the tax relief Ad is Ad = τ(1+e) where e 
is the enhancement rate (which is 75% for SMEs and 30% for large companies in 2009-10 and 
100% for SMEs and 30% for large companies in 2011). In the case of payable tax credit, the value 
of the tax relief Ac is Ac = c(1+e) where 𝑐 is the payable tax credit rate (which is 14% for SMEs in 
2009-11 and 12.5% for SMEs in 2011 and always zero for large companies). Finally, the average 
tax-adjusted user cost of R&D under each scheme is an average of the user costs under each case, 
46 Formally, the numerator of the tax price elasticity should be the R&D capital stock rather than flow expenditure. 
However, in steady state the R&D flow will be equal to R&D stock multiplied by the depreciation rate. Since the 
depreciation rate is the same for large and small firms around the discontinuity, it cancels out (see Appendix A). 
47 As the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D for large companies remains unchanged over 2006-11 (Table A11), it seems 
reasonable to use the average R&D over 2006-08 as a proxy for how much an average firm would spend on R&D if 
it remained a large company over 2009-11. 
48 For robustness checks, we use estimates from various alternative first stage specifications, including both OLS and 
Poisson specifications, and derive estimates for log difference in R&D investment in the range of 0.69 to 1.08 (see 
Appendix B). 
49 In some situations, a firm can first use the tax deduction feature to reduce its chargeable profits to zero, then claim 
the rest of the enhanced qualifying R&D expenditure using the payable tax credit feature. This is called a combination 
claim. However, given the very few number of combination claims in our baseline sample, we ignore this case for 
simplicity. 
20 
weighted by the probability, Pr(. ), that a firm will have no corporate tax liability: 
𝜌𝑓 = Pr(𝐻𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) × 𝜌𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒
𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + Pr(𝑁𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) × 𝜌𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑒
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 .
To calculate this we use the share of firms in the sample with corporate tax liabilities in 
2006 and 2007, which is 45%, as a proxy for Pr(𝐻𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦). The effective tax rate 𝜏 is 
28% in 2009-10 and 26% in 2011.50 The average tax-adjusted user cost of R&D is 0.15 under the 
SME scheme and 0.19 under the large company scheme over 2009-11, which translates into a log 
difference in user cost of 0.27. 
Putting all these elements together we obtain a tax-price elasticity of R&D of 2.6 (= 
0.71/0.27). This is somewhat higher than the typical values of between 1 and 2 found in other 
studies.51  However, almost all previous studies have effectively focused on larger firms such as 
publicly listed firms or using state/macro data which will be dominated by the expenditures of 
larger firms (due to the concentration of  R&D ). Our sample, by contrast, is predominantly of 
SMEs around the €86m threshold. As these firms are more likely to be credit constrained (espe-
cially during and after the global financial crisis), they are likely to be more responsive to R&D 
tax incentives. 
Some evidence for the hypothesis that there are larger treatment effects for the more finan-
cially constrained firms is presented in Table 7. First, we split the sample by firm age, as younger 
firms are much more likely to be credit constrained than older ones. Splitting by median age we 
find that although the effect of the policy is significant in both sub-samples, it is proportionately 
larger for the young firms. R&D rises by a factor of 2.4 for the young and only 1.9 for the old 
(columns (1) and (2)). Furthermore, when we use the after-before design, the treatment effect is 
significant for young firms, but smaller and insignificant for older firms (columns (3) and (4)). 
Estimates from the after-before design gives a treatment effect to baseline ratio of 2.6 for young 
firms and 0.5 for old firms, a difference that is significant at the 10% level (the implied tax price 
elasticities are 4.7 and 1.6 respectively).52 
50 We set the real interest rate 𝑟 to 5% and depreciation rate 𝛿 to 15%. As ln(𝑟 + 𝛿) cancels out in ln( 𝜌𝑆𝑀𝐸 /𝜌𝐿𝐶𝑂),
the value of these two last parameters do not affect our final tax-price elasticity estimate. 
51 See the surveys in Becker (2015), OECD (2014), Fowkes, Sousa, and Duncan (2015), Hall and Van Reenen (2000). 
52 The log difference in the user cost of R&D among younger firms is 0.274, as the probability of payable tax credits 
is 67%. The log difference in the user cost among older firms is 0.267, as the probability of the payable tax credits is 
44%. 
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One concern is that young firms respond more to the R&D tax policy not because they are 
financially constrained, but because they are more likely to have zero corporate tax liabilities and 
therefore benefit more from the SME scheme via payable tax credit. We directly address this con-
cern by comparing the responses of young and old firms only among firms with corporate tax 
liabilities for at least one year between 2005 and 2007 (columns (5) to (8) of Table 6). As before, 
we find that young firms still have a much higher treatment effect to baseline ratio in this subsam-
ple: 2.4 to 0.5 among old firms, implying tax price elasticities of 4.8 and 1.6 respectively. Though 
these differences are not statistically significant due to smaller sample size, they support our hy-
pothesis that the larger treatment effects we find are driven by financially constrained firms.53 
5.3 Cost effectiveness of the R&D Tax Relief Scheme 
A full welfare analysis of the R&D policy is complex as one needs to take into account 
general equilibrium effects through spillovers (see below) and possibly aggregate effects on sci-
entists’ wages (Goolsbee, 1998). We take one step in this direction by implementing a simple 
“value for money” calculation based on how much additional R&D is generated per pound sterling 
of taxpayer money (“Exchequer Costs”). The details of the calculations are in Appendix A5, but 
we summarize them here. 
As described in the previous sub-section, we obtain empirical estimates of the tax-price 
elasticity from the 2008 policy change. In addition, for every year we can also calculate the differ-
ence in the user costs of R&D generated by the policy parameters of the tax system. We do this 
separately for each of the three R&D schemes: SME deductible, SME payable tax credit and large 
company scheme. This allows us to calculate the value for money ratio, 
∆𝑅𝐷
∆𝐸𝐶
 separately for each
scheme in each year. From the HMRC data (HMRC 2015) we also know the amount given out in 
each of the three schemes by the government (ΔEC). Combining this with the value for money 
ratio (derived from the tax elasticity and the user costs) enables us to calculate the counterfactual 
level of aggregate R&D. 
The estimated R&D tax-price elasticity of 2.6 implies that a firm entering the SME scheme 
53 Replicating the exercise using the sub-sample of firms with no corporate tax liabilities 2005-07 gives a treatment 
effect (relative to baseline R&D) ratios of 2.8 for young firms and 0.5 for older firms, implying tax price elasticities 
of 4.7 and 1.5 respectively.  
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as a result of the new threshold increases its R&D by 84% of its pre-policy level in the tax deduc-
tion case, and 109% of its pre-policy R&D in the payable tax credit case. The corresponding in-
crease in Exchequer costs by the same firm is 31% of its pre-policy R&D in the tax deduction case, 
and 51% of its pre-policy R&D in the payable tax credit case. In both cases, roughly half of this 
increase is to cover more generous tax relief applied to the firm’s old level of R&D, while the other 
half covers tax relief applied to the firm’s additional R&D. The implied “value for the money” 
ratio of the 2008 policy change, as measured by additional R&D over additional Exchequer costs, 
thus ranges from 2.1 in the payable tax credit case to 2.7 in the tax deduction case.  
If we generalize the estimated R&D tax-price elasticity of 2.6 to the whole population of 
SMEs, we can do a similar calculation for the overall SME scheme between 2006 and 2011. Value 
for money ratios are on average 2.79 for the deduction scheme and 2.13 for the tax credit scheme. 
Combining these ratios with Exchequer costs statistics gives us estimates of the additional SME 
R&D induced which averages at £719m per year (£321m from the deductible and £398m from 
payable tax credit). Total SME qualified R&D averaged £1,745m, so this is a substantial fraction. 
SME R&D would have been 41% lower in the absence of the UK R&D tax credit system.  
We also repeat the exercise for the population of large companies, but with more conserva-
tive R&D tax-price elasticity of 1.054 as these firms are likely less responsive to tax incentives, 
and obtain value for the money ratios of around 1.4. These translate into an average of £919m 
additional R&D (about 11% of total large firm’s qualified R&D spending).  
Putting these figures together suggests that the R&D Tax Relief Scheme induced an aver-
age of £1.64bn per year 2006-11, while costing the Exchequer £0.96bn in lost tax revenue – a 
value for money ratio of 1.7. The UK’s qualifying R&D spending would have been about 16% 
lower in the absence of this fiscal support. This suggests that the tax policy was important in the 
macro-economic performance of UK R&D. In Figure 4 we show estimates of the counterfactual 
business R&D (BERD) to GDP ratio estimated in the absence of the tax relief scheme (see Appen-
dix A.5 for details). It is striking that since the early 1980s UK BERD became an increasingly 
small share of GDP, whereas it generally rose in other major economies. According to our estimates 
54 This follows the conclusions from literature surveys (e.g. Becker, 2014). These elasticity assumptions are likely to 
underestimate the benefits of the policy as (i) the literature may have under-estimated the elasticity due to weaker 
identification approached and (ii) since we find larger elasticities for medium sized firms, the responsiveness may be 
even larger for the much smaller firms who are well below the asset thresholds we consider. 
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this decline would have continued were it not for the introduction and extension of a more generous 
fiscal regime in the 2000s.55 Business R&D would have been 10% lower over the 2006-2011 pe-
riod (total BERD is larger than tax qualifying R&D). 
A full welfare analysis would likely produce even larger benefit to cost ratios than 1.7. 
First, since the taxpayer costs are transfers, only the deadweight cost of tax should be considered 
(e.g. Gruber, 2011, uses 40%). Second, the additional R&D is likely to have technological spillo-
vers to other firms, raising their innovation rates (e.g. Bloom et al. 2013). We examine these spill-
over effects in sub-section 6.5. 
6. Extensions and Robustness
6.1 Intensive versus extensive margins 
The additional amount of R&D induced by the policy could come from firms which would 
not have done any R&D without the scheme (i.e. the extensive margin) or from firms which would 
have done R&D, although in smaller amounts (i.e. the intensive margin). It turns out that the main 
R&D effects are coming from the intensive margin (Table A6). Estimating the R&D equation 
where the outcome is a dummy for whether the firm performs R&D produces insignificant effects. 
By contrast, when the outcome is whether a firm patents there remains a positive and significant 
effect.56 Similarly, if we split by industry, the strongest effects of the policy come from those sec-
tors that are more intensive in R&D and patents (Table A8).57  
We also split the baseline sample into firms which made some capital investment in the 
2005-07 pre-policy period, and firms that did not (Table A9).58 The policy effect on R&D and 
innovation is larger among firms who had invested, suggesting that current R&D and capital in-
vestments are more likely to be complements than substitutes. This result is consistent with the 
55 The trend annual decline in business R&D intensity was 1.9% between 1981 and 1999. We estimate that in the 
absence of the policy change the decline would have continued at 1.7% a year 1999 to 2012. 
56 Table A7 shows similar findings by splitting the sample by firms with and without R&D or patents in the past. Both 
R&D and patent effects come mainly through the intensive margin, driven by firms with past R&D or patents.  
57 These are shown by splitting at median of industry patent intensity, and we generate the same qualitative pattern if 
we repeat the exercise using R&D intensity. Examples of high-patenting industries include electric domestic appli-
ances, basic pharmaceutical products, medical and surgical equipment, organic and inorganic basic chemicals, optical 
and photographic equipment, etc. 
58 Due to limited coverage of investments in FAME, we use data on machinery and plant expenditure reported in 
CT600 as a proxy for capital investments. 
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idea that firms having previously made R&D capital investments have lower adjustment costs and 
therefore respond more to R&D tax incentives (Agrawal, Rosell, and Simcoe 2014).  
6.2 R&D tax effects on other aspects of firm performance 
We also examined several other measures of firm performance such as size and productiv-
ity using the baseline specification. These results are to be taken with caution. First, there are many 
missing values on accounting values of employment and sales as UK accounting regulations do 
not insist on these being reported for smaller and medium sized enterprises (as in the US). Second, 
our available panel ends in 2011 and so we will not capture all the long-run effects. Table 8 shows 
that there does appear to be some positive effect on sales (Panel A) and employment (Panel C),59 
but not on capital (Panel B), although the standard errors are large. There is a slight tendency for 
the policy impact on sales and employment to become stronger over time (e.g. the coefficients are 
insignificant in 2009, but larger and significant in 2010). The estimates of the policy effect on total 
factor productivity (TFP, Panel D)60 are very imprecise but there is a significant effect in the final 
column. We should not read too much into this given the smaller sample sizes, but there is a hint 
of the policy effect starting with R&D which shifts patents then finally affects productivity.  
6.3 How firms cluster around the threshold in later years 
As discussed in Section 3, we chose total assets in 2007 as our primary running variable to 
avoid potential endogenous sorting of firms across the threshold once the policy effective date was 
announced in 2008. We test the validity of our primary running variable choice and our concern 
by performing the McCrary test for each year from 2006 to 2011,61 which estimates the disconti-
nuity in firms’ total asset distribution at the SME threshold of €86m. The respective McCrary tests 
for 2006 and 2007 (Figure A3) confirm that firms did not manipulate their total assets to benefit 
59 If we subtract imputed R&D staff count from employment to net out the impact of the policy on raising R&D, the 
effects are smaller but qualitatively similar. The effects in log term (standard errors) on adjusted employment in 2010 
and 2011 on adjusted employment are 0.24 (0.15), and 0.27 (0.15) respectively. 
60 TFP is calculated as ln(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) −  (1−∝𝑙)ln(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) − ∝𝑙 ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) , where ∝𝑙 is the share of labor costs
in total revenue at the two-digit industry level across all firms in the FAME dataset averaged across the 2006-11 period. 
Material share is not included due to very limited reporting of material costs in FAME. 
61 We exclude 2008 as the increase in deduction rate for large companies became effective before the effective date 
for the changes in the SME scheme (including increase in deduction rate for SMEs and SME definition change) was 
announced much later in the year. As such, it is hard to predict which way the bunching would happen in this year, or 
if it would happen at all. 
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from the SME scheme before 2008.62 On the other hand, there is some graphical evidence of firms’ 
bunching right below the €86m from 2009 onward, which is most obvious in 2009 and 2011. Fi-
nally, Figure A4 pools together the two years before the policy change (2006-07) and Figure A5 
the three years after the change (2009-11). Again, it is apparent from these graphs that endogenous 
sorting does seem to happen, but only from 2009 onward after the policy became effective.  
6.4 Exploiting other elements of the SME definition 
We also explored using other elements of SME definition (sales and employment) to esti-
mate the impacts of the policy and R&D and innovation outputs (Table A10). We must interpret 
this with caution because, as noted above, there are many missing values on sales and employment. 
Furthermore, we also find evidence that the asset criterion is more binding than the sales criterion. 
As a firm is considered an SME if it meets either the asset or the sales criterion, the asset criterion 
is binding only when the firm already fails the sales one and vice versa. The binding/non-binding 
ratio for the asset criterion is 0.36, considerably higher than the binding/non-binding ratio of 0.20 
for sales criterion (Figure A6).63  
As expected, while we still find positive effects on R&D and innovation outputs using the 
sales or employment criterion (Table A10) but these effects are not always statistically significant. 
They are also of smaller magnitude compared to our baseline effects estimated using the asset 
criterion when taking into consideration the baseline R&D and patent count of the respective sam-
ple. The treatment effect to baseline ratios for R&D using asset, sales, and employment criteria are 
1.92, 1.27, and 0.39 respectively, and the same set of ratios for patent count are 1.22, 0.42, and 
62 This is the log difference in density height at the SME threshold. The coefficient (standard error) is 0.029 (0.065) 
in 2006 and -0.026 (0.088) in 2007. 
63 Binding/non-binding ratio for the asset criterion is calculated as number of firms with sales in 2007 between €100m 
and €180m/number of firms with sales in 2007 between €20m and €100m, conditioned on firms’ total assets in 2007 
being between €36m and €136m (i.e. +/-€50m window around the asset threshold of €86m). Binding/non-binding 
ratio for the sales criterion is calculated as the number of firms with total assets in 2008 between €6m and €86m/num-
ber of firms with total assets in 2007 between €86m and €166m, conditioned on firms’ sales in 2007 being between 
€50m and €150m (i.e. +/-€50m window around the sales threshold of €100m). The qualitative result that the asset 
criterion is more binding than the sales criterion does not change when we pick different windows to calculate the 
binding/non-binding ratios. 
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0.85.64 We also examined whether combining the different SME criteria could increase the effi-
ciency of our estimates, but found no significant improvement.65  
6.5 R&D technology spillovers 
The main economic rationale usually given for more generous tax treatment of R&D is that 
there are technological externalities, so the social return to R&D exceeds the private return. Our 
study design allows us to estimate the causal impact of R&D spillovers on innovation by other 
firms. Following the work of Jaffe (1986) we calculate the knowledge spillover pool available to 




  where rdj,09-11 is the average R&D of firm j over 2009-
11 and ωij is measure of technological “proximity” between firms i and j as indicated by which 
technology classes a firm patents in (e.g. if two firms have identical distributions of patent classes 
then proximity is 1 and if they are in entirely different patent classes the proximity is zero).66 We 
follow our earlier approach of using Ej, 2007 as instrument for rdj,09-11 where Ej,2007 is the below-
asset-threshold dummy in 2007 for firm j.67 Consequently, we construct SpilltechSMEi,09-11 = 
64 Even when we restrict the sample to firms for which the sales criterion binds when using the sales running variable, 
the percentage effects are still lower than our baseline results, and are not statistically significant.
65 The asset threshold almost always generates large and statistically significant effects on both R&D and patents, 
while the sales threshold does not (columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) in Panel B of Table A10). Joint F-statistics for below-
asset-threshold dummy and below-sales-threshold dummy indicate that their effects on both R&D and innovation out-
puts are jointly significant in all cases. Finally, the estimated effects of R&D on innovation outputs using both criteria 
as instrumental variables for R&D are of similar magnitude to our baseline effect of 0.530 (0.698 and 0.410 in columns 
(3) and (6) respectively). However, these estimates are less precise due to the inclusion of an additional weak below-
sales-threshold dummy instrument.
66 Following Jaffe (1986) we define proximity as the uncentered angular correlation between the vectors of the pro-














 is firm 𝑖’s number of patents in technology field 𝜏 as a share of firm 𝑖’s total number of patents. To calculate 
𝐹𝑖𝜏, we use information on all patents filed between 1900 and 2011 (80% of these patents are filed after 1980) and
their 3-digit International Patent Classification (IPC), which classifies patents into 123 different technology fields. 
These data are available from PATSTAT.  Bloom et al. (2013) show that the Jaffe measure delivers similar results to 
more sophisticated measures of proximity. 
67 More generally, 𝐸𝑖,2007 = 𝐼{ 𝑧𝑖,2007 ≤ ?̃? } is a binary indicator equal to one if the 2007 financial variable 𝑧𝑖,2007 is






  as instrument for SpilltechRDi,09-11.  The exclusion restriction requires that the discon-
tinuity induced random fluctuations in firm j’s eligibility would only affect connected firm i’s R&D 
and innovation outputs through R&D spillovers.  
Our main spillover IV regression estimates the impact of SpilltechRDi,09-11 on firm i’s inno-
vation, pati,09-11 controlling for firm i’s own R&D, rdj,09-11: 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖,09−11 =  𝛼4 + 𝛿𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11 + 𝜃𝑟𝑑𝑖,09−11 + 𝐺(𝑧𝑗,2007) + 𝑓4(𝑧𝑖,2007) +  𝜀4𝑖   (4) 
where 𝐺(𝑧𝑗,2007) =  ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑔(𝑧𝑗,2007)𝑗≠𝑖  and 𝑓4(𝑧𝑖,2007) and 𝑔(𝑧𝑗,2007) are polynomials of total as-
sets in 2007.68 We instrument 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11  with 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,2007 and we instrument
own R&D, 𝑟𝑑𝑖,09−11, with 𝐸𝑖,2007 exactly as we did earlier in the paper. 
We estimate equation (4) on the sample of firms with total assets in 2007 between €46m 
and €126m (as in Figure 1). This is a larger sample than in the baseline sample as the policy-
induced R&D can have spillovers on firms well beyond the policy threshold.69  
Column (1) of Table 9 reports the first stage for the R&D spillover term and column (2) 
the first stage for own R&D. As expected the instrument 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,2007 significantly predicts 
𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11, in the first column and the instrument 𝐸𝑖,2007 significantly predicts firm 𝑖’s 
R&D expenditure in the second column. More interestingly, we see that in the reduced form patent 
model of column (3) the R&D spillover term 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,2007 has a large and significant posi-
tive effect on firm 𝑖’s patents. The spillover term is in fact statistically stronger than the own R&D 
effect, due to collinearity issues. If we drop the spillover measure from column (3) for example, 
the coefficient on 𝐸𝑖,2007 becomes significant on own patents as in our baseline regressions. 
68 An RD Design model for firm 𝑗’s R&D yields 𝑟𝑑𝑗,09−11 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝑆𝐸𝑖,2007 + 𝑔(𝑧𝑗,2007) + 𝜀𝑗 . Aggregating this equa-
tion across all connected firm 𝑗’s around the SME asset threshold, using 𝜔𝑖𝑗  as weights, yields ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑑𝑗,09−11𝑗≠𝑖 =
𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗≠𝑖 𝐹𝑆
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝐸𝑖,2007𝑗≠𝑖 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑔(𝑧𝑗,2007)𝑗≠𝑖 + ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝜀𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 . Rewriting the latter equation then yields
𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11 = 𝛼 ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝛽𝐹𝑆𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,2007 + 𝐺(𝑧𝑗,2007) + 𝜂𝑖, which shows that 𝐺(𝑧𝑗.2007) is the ap-
propriate “RD-style” polynomial control when using 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,2007 as instrument for 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷𝑖,2007.
69 Note that 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11 is calculated using the population of all possible firm 𝑗’s, while 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,2007
and 𝐺(𝑧𝑗,2007) are calculated using all firm 𝑗’s with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m (our baseline RD
sample), as  the RD Design works best in samples of firms around the relevant threshold. Also, in all reported results, 
we use third order polynomial controls separately on each side of the threshold for 𝑔(𝑧𝑗,2007) and 𝑓4(𝑧𝑖,2007). In this
larger sample we found that higher order terms were significant (unlike in the earlier Tables on smaller samples). 
However, using different orders of polynomial controls does not change our qualitative findings. 
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Turning to the IV results column (4) shows that there appears to be no significant effect of 
other firms’ R&D on own R&D. By contrast, the last two columns show that R&D by a firm’s 
technological neighbors (𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11) does have a causal impact on patenting consistent 
with the patent reduced form of column (4). In addition to the instrumented spillover term, column 
(5) includes the instrument for own R&D and in column (6) we instrument own R&D by the usual 
own asset threshold. The magnitude of the spillover coefficient is similar in both specifications. In 
column (6) a £1m increase in R&D by a firm with an identical technological profile will increase 
patenting by 0.009, which is 3.3% of an equivalent R&D increase by the firm itself (=0.009/0.273). 
These findings are broadly consistent with Bloom et al.’s (2013) theoretical predictions 
that R&D technology spillovers should positively affect innovations, but have an ambiguous effect 
on own R&D. Finally, estimates from our baseline spillover regression (column (6)) again suggest 
the presence of positive R&D spillovers on innovations.  
There may be some negative R&D spillovers through business stealing effects among firms 
in similar product markets. To address this concern, we follow Bloom et al. (2013) and construct 
𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11 = ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑑𝑗,09−11𝑗≠𝑖  that captures the R&D spillovers in product market space,
where 𝜙𝑖𝑗 is a measure of product market distance between firms 𝑖 and 𝑗.
70 Similar to the above,
we also construct 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,2007 = ∑ 𝜙𝑖𝑗𝐸𝑖,2007𝑗≠𝑖  as instrument for 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11. We
found some evidence for strategic complementarity in R&D, but there were no significant effects 
of 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑅𝐷𝑖,09−11 on patents. 
Together, these findings provide evidence that policy-induced R&D have sizable positive 
impacts on not only R&D performing firms but also other firms operating in similar technology 
areas, as measured by innovation outputs, which further supports the use of R&D subsidies in the 
UK context.  
7. Conclusion
Fiscal incentives for R&D have become an increasingly popular policy of supporting in-
novation across the world. But little is known about whether these costly tax breaks causally raise 
70 𝜙𝑖𝑗 = 1 if firm 𝑖 operates in the same industry as firm 𝑗 and 𝜙𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise. To calculate 𝜙𝑖𝑗, we use firms’ 
primary industry codes at 3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC). These data are available from FAME.     
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innovation. We address this issue by exploiting a change in the UK R&D tax regime in 2008 which 
raised the size threshold determining whether a firm was eligible for the more generous “SME” 
tax regime. This enables us to implement a Regression Discontinuity Design and assess impact of 
the policy on R&D and innovation (as measured by patenting). Using total assets in the pre-policy 
period of 2007 we show that there was no evidence of discontinuities around the threshold prior 
to the policy, which is unsurprising as the new threshold was only relevant for the R&D tax incen-
tive scheme and not for other programs targeting SMEs. 
The policy caused an economically and statistically significant increase in R&D and pa-
tenting, and there is no evidence that the new patenting was of significantly lower value. Hence 
R&D tax policies do seem effective in increasing innovation, they are not simply devices for rela-
beling existing spending. The elasticity of R&D with respect to changes in its (tax adjusted) user 
cost is around 2.6. We argue that this is higher than existing estimates because we focus on firms 
that are smaller than those conventionally used in the extant literature and are more likely to be 
subject to financial constraints. The policy seems to be cost effective, in aggregate stimulating £1.7 
of R&D for every £1 of taxpayer subsidy. Over the 2006-2011 period we calculate that the tax 
scheme meant aggregate R&D was 16% higher than it would otherwise have been, halting the 
secular decline of the UK’s share of business R&D in GDP. 
There are many caveats when moving from these results to policy. Although the results are 
optimistic about the efficacy of tax incentives, the large effects come from smaller firms and should 
not be generalized across the entire size distribution – this does imply that targeting R&D policy 
on financially constrained SMEs is worthwhile (although a first best policy would be to deal di-
rectly with credit market imperfections).  
We have partially examined general equilibrium effects by demonstrating that the R&D tax 
policy stimulated patenting activity not only for the firms directly affected, but also created spill-
overs for other firms who were indirectly affected. However, there may be other equilibrium effects 
that reduce innovation. For example, subsidies are captured in the form of higher wages rather than 
a higher volume of R&D, especially in the short-run. We believe that this is less likely to be a first 
order problem when there is large international mobility of inventors, as is the case in the UK (e.g. 
e.g. Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva, 2015, and within the US see Moretti and Wilson, 2015). 
Finally, it is unclear if tax breaks are the optimal form of support for innovation. Direct support of 
basic R&D in the science base and increasing the supply of future talent into the innovation sector 
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(e.g. Bell et al., 2015) are policies that may have more powerful effects on innovation and growth 
in the long term. 
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Figure 1. McCrary test for no manipulation at the SME asset threshold in 2007 
Note: McCrary test for discontinuity in distribution density of total assets in 2007 at the SME asset threshold of €86m. 
Sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 between €46m and €126m. The discontinuity estimate (log difference 
in density height at the SME threshold) is -0.026, with standard error of 0.088. 
Figure 2. Discontinuity in average R&D expenditure over 2009-11 
Note: The figure corresponds to the baseline R&D expenditure regression using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) 
Design. The dependent variable is average R&D expenditure over 2009-11. The running variable is total assets in 
2007 with a threshold of €86m. The baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 €25m above and €25m 
below the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for the running variable are estimated separately on each 
side of the threshold. The OLS discontinuity estimate at the €86m threshold is 138,540 with a standard error of 55,318. 
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Figure 3. Discontinuity in average number of patents over 2009-11 
Note: The figure corresponds to our baseline reduced-form patent regression using an RD Design. The dependent 
variable is average number of patents over 2009-11. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of 
€86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 €25m above and below the cut-off (i.e. between €61m 
and €111m). Controls for running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. The OLS disconti-
nuity estimate at the €86m threshold is 0.073 with a standard error of 0.026. Bin size for the scatter plot is €3m. 
Figure 4. Business Enterprise R&D over GDP, selected countries 
Note: The data is from OECD MSTI downloaded February 9th 2016. The dotted line is the counterfactual R&D inten-
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Table 1. Baseline sample descriptive statistics 
Sample 
Firms with total assets in 2007 
between €61m and €86m 
Firms with total assets in 2007 
between €86m and €111m 










Total no. firms in the subsample 3,561 2,327 
Mean  qual. R&D exp. (£ ’000) 50.0 70.9 52.6 68.9 71.8 75.3 57.8 72.0 87.1 110.6 85.7 100.5 91.9 88.4 94.5 93.6 
Mean patents 0.065 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.061 0.058 0.056 0.066 0.053 0.041 0.040 0.044 0.058 0.042 
Mean UK patents 0.078 0.084 0.078 0.072 0.067 0.070 0.080 0.070 0.062 0.081 0.074 0.056 0.045 0.050 0.072 0.050 
Mean EPO patents 0.028 0.032 0.036 0.031 0.028 0.024 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.020 0.025 0.023 0.030 0.023 
Note: The baseline sample includes 5,888 firms with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m. Total assets are from FAME and are converted to € from £ using HMRC 
rules. Qualifying R&D expenditure comes from CT600 panel dataset and are converted to 2007 prices. Patent counts come from PATSTAT. 
Table 2. R&D regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable R&D expenditure (£ ’000) 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) Before After Difference 





After - Before 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
61.5 96.1 32.0 120.7** 157.8*** 137.2** 63.2 138.5** 75.3** 
(58.5) (72.1) (40.4) (59.0) (58.6) (53.7) (53.4) (55.3) (36.3) 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the 
running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Mean R&D between 2006 and 2008 was £72,312 and between 
2009 and 2011 was £80,545. 2007 real prices. 
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Table 3. Pre-treatment covariate balance tests and placebo tests 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Ln(Sales) Ln(Fixed assets) Ln(Employment) R&D exp. (£ ’000) 
Year 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2009-11 average 
Below asset threshold dummy 
(in 2007) 
-0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.15 -16.5 48.6 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (41.7) (77.1) 
SME threshold (€) 86m 86m 86m 86m 86m 86m 71m 101m 
Sample bandwidth 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 46-86m 86-126m 
Firms 3,650 3,848 4,771 5,083 2,972 3,089 7,095 3,354 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the 
running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Columns 1-6 report pre-treatment covariate tests for sales, 
employment, and capital. Columns (7) and (8) report placebo tests using placebo asset threshold of €71m and €101m. 
Table 4: Reduced-form patent regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable All patent count 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) Before After Difference 





After - Before 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
0.026 0.043 0.045 0.081*** 0.066** 0.074** 0.038 0.073*** 0.035* 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.020) 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design.  The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firm’s total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the running 
variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Mean patent count between 2006 and 2008 was 0.060 and between 2009 
and 2011 was 0.052. 
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Table 5: The effects of R&D tax policy on patent quality 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the 
running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Quality measures are baseline patent count (column 1), EPO patent 
count (column 2), UK patent count (column 3), patent by family count (i.e. patent by country count) (column 4), chemistry/pharmaceutical patent count (column 5), and non-
chemistry/pharmaceutical patent count (column 6), EPO patent by citation count (column 7), and UK patent by citation count (column 8). 
Table 6. Effects of R&D on patents (IV regressions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  (2009-11 average) All patent count EPO patent count UK patent count 
Specification OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
R&D expenditure (£ million), 
2009-11 average 
0.168** 0.530** 0.094** 0.268* 0.207** 0.680** 
(0.074) (0.254) (0.04) (0.140) (0.093) (0.327) 
Anderson-Rubin test p-value 0.005 0.024 0.004 
Hausman test p-value 0.15 0.32 0.12 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Instrumental variable is the dummy whether total assets in 2007 is below €86m. Baseline sample includes firms 
with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the running variable (total assets in 
2007) separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Adjusted first-stage F-statistic is 6.3. P-values of Anderson-Rubin weak-
instrument-robust inference tests indicate that the IV estimates are statistically different from zero even in the possible case of weak IV.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 











Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
0.073*** 0.037** 0.094*** 0.214** 0.024* 0.050** 0.004** 0.023 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.033) (0.085) (0.014) (0.022) (0.002) (0.021) 
Dependent variable 
mean over 2006-08 
0.060 0.031 0.077 0.222 0.015 0.045 0.013 0.062 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
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Table 7. Heterogeneous effects of R&D Tax policy by firm age (as proxies for financial constraints) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable R&D expenditure (£ ’000) 
Year After (2009-11 avg.) After - Before After (2009-11 average) After - Before 
Subsample Young firms Old firms Young firms Old firms 
Young firms 
& profits > 0 
Old firms & 
profits > 0 
Young firms 
& profits > 0 
Old firms & 
profits > 0 
Below asset threshold dummy 
(in 2007) 
92.3** 198.4* 97.9** 56.3 124.5* 107.7 111.0 46.0 
(42.1) (104.2) (42.2) (59.4) (70.0) (120.7) (93.2) (79.6) 
Mean over 2006-08 37.9 107.1 46.2 90.6 
Mean after - before 2.8 46.8 -8.6 29.4 
Firms 2,928 2,955 2,928 2,955 956 1,585 956 1,585 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. 
Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for the running variable separately 
for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Columns (1)-(4): Median firm age in 2007 is 12 years. Ratios of treatment effect to baseline 
mean R&D over 2006-08 for young and old firms are 2.6 and 0.5 respectively which are statistically different at the 10% level. The implied tax-price elasticities are 4.7 among 
young firms and 1.6 among old firms and these are also statistically different at 10% level. Columns (5)-(8): “Profits > 0” indicates that a firm had corporate tax liabilities at 
some point between 2005 and 2007. Ratios of treatment effect to baseline mean R&D over 2006-08 for young and old firms are 2.8 and 0.5 respectively. Implied tax-price 
elasticities are 4.8 among young firms and 1.6 among old firms.  
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Table 8. Effects of R&D Tax Relief Scheme on other measures of firms performance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A. Dependent variable:  Ln(sales) 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) Before     After          Difference 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-08 2009-11 After - Before 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.187 0.029 -0.102 0.212 0.404** 0.297 -0.012 0.231 0.218* 
(0.170) (0.167) (0.162) (0.180) (0.187) (0.192) (0.154) (0.177) (0.114) 
Firms 3,292 3,439 3,393 3,311 3,294 3,255 3,398 3,398 3,398 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Ln(capital) 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.017 -0.035 -0.0096 -0.020 -0.008 0.010 -0.077 -0.038 0.039 
(0.120) (0.109) (0.113) (0.122) (0.131) (0.135) (0.106) (0.124) (0.077) 
Firms 3,721 3,958 3,791 3,608 3,451 3,316 3,651 3,651 3,651 
Panel C. Dependent variable: Ln(employment) 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.0118 0.102 0.0838 0.107 0.263* 0.292* 0.055 0.188 0.134 
(0.126) (0.123) (0.131) (0.140) (0.147) (0.153) (0.125) (0.141) (0.086) 
Firms 2,468 2,550 2,431 2,445 2,551 2,469 2,387 2,387 2,387 
Panel D. Dependent variable:  Total factor productivity 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
-0.328 -0.106 -0.199 -0.0321 0.123 0.0239 -0.120 0.127 0.247** 
(0.255) (0.237) (0.235) (0.245) (0.258) (0.264) (0.234) (0.245) (0.118) 
Firms 2,025 2,091 2,017 1,952 1,913 1,881 1,989 1,989 1,989 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) results (OLS). The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold 
of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for the running variable 
separately for each side of the threshold and two digit industry dummies are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm in brackets. Panel A uses sales from CT600. Panel 
B uses fixed assets (from FAME). Panel C uses employment (from FAME). Total factor productivity in Panel D is calculated as ln(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) −  (1−∝𝑙)ln(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) −
 ∝𝑙 ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) , where ∝𝑙  is the share of labor costs in total revenue at the two-digit industry level across all firms in the FAME dataset averaged across the 2006-2011 
period. Columns (7) – (9) condition on the “balanced” sample where we observe the outcome variable in at least one year of the pre-policy sample and one year of the post-
policy sample (i.e. it is a sub-sample of the observations in columns (1) – (6)). 
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Table 9: Estimating R&D technology spillovers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













All patent count 
𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸 
(sum tech. distance x dummy) 
35.9*** 133.9 0.344** 
(11.0) (204.7) (0.146) 
Below asset threshold dummy (in 2007) 
-0.5 180.7** 0.045 182.4** 0.050 
(4.1) (83.8) (0.052) (80.1) (0.063) 
𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷
(sum tech. distance x £ million) 
3.7 0.010** 0.009* 
(5.6) (0.005) (0.005) 
R&D expenditure (£ million), 2009-11 average 
0.273 
(0.368) 
Mean over 2006-08 22.7 65.3 0.059 65.3 0.059 0.059 
Firms 10,449 10,449 10,449 10,440 10,449 10,449 
Note: Sample of firms with total assets in 2007 between €46m and €126m. *** Significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Standard errors clustered by firm in brackets. 
Controls include third order polynomials of total assets in 2007, separately for each side of the asset threshold of €86m, and 𝐺(𝑧𝑗,2007) =  ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑔(𝑧𝑗,2007)𝑗≠𝑖  as described in sub-
section 5.8; 𝑔(𝑧𝑗,2007) are third order polynomials of technology-connected firms’ total assets in 2007, also separately for each side of the asset threshold. In column (6), the
instrument variable for 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑅𝐷 is 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑆𝑀𝐸 and instrument variable for R&D expenditure is below-asset-threshold dummy.      
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APPENDICES: FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY 
Appendix A: Institutional details of policy and tax-adjusted user cost 
A.1 SME definition 
The UK Tax Relief Scheme’s SME (Small and Medium Sized Enterprise) definition is set 
according to the European Commission’s Recommendations 1996/280/EC (effective up to December 31st 
2004) and 2003/361/EC (effective from January 1st 2005). The definition is based on assets (“balance 
sheet total”), employment (“staff headcount”) and sales (“turnover”) as described in Section 2. There are 
also some restrictions on the type of eligible enterprises. Below is a summary of the SME definition 
according to Recommendations 2003/361/EC. For further technical details on many parts of the tax 
rules see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD91400.htm.  
 Measurements of staff headcount, assets, and sales turnover for ceiling tests: The assets is 
the gross amount of assets shown in the accounts. The staff headcount of an enterprise represents the 
number of full-time person-years attributable to people who have worked within or for the enterprise 
during the year under consideration.1 For the purposes of the sales turnover test, VAT and other indirect 
taxes are excluded from the figures. The staff headcount and financial data used for the “ceiling tests” 
(the maximum values possible for a firm to be eligible for SME status) are those relating to the latest 
approved accounting period, calculated on an annual basis and aggregated according to the rules 
described below. Assets and sales figures are converted to euros using the exchange rate on the last day 
of the relevant accounting period, or the average exchange rate throughout that accounting period 
(whichever is more beneficial for the enterprise).  
An enterprise passes the ceiling tests if its staff headcount and either its aggregated assets or its 
aggregated turnover fall below the respective ceilings. An enterprise loses (acquires) its SME status if it 
fails (passes) the ceiling tests over two consecutive accounting periods.  
Account aggregation rules for different enterprise types: In the case of an autonomous 
enterprise, the staff headcount and financial data are determined exclusively on the basis of the accounts 
of the enterprise (or the consolidated accounts) of the enterprise itself.2 In the case of a linked enterprise, 
the ceiling tests are applied to the aggregates of the figures in its own accounts and those from the accounts 
of all other enterprises to which it is linked (including non-UK ones), unless the linked enterprises’ 
1 The contributions of part-time workers, or those who work on a seasonal or temporary basis count as appropriate 
fractions of a full-time person-year. The term staff includes employees, persons seconded to the enterprise, owner-
managers, partners (other than sleeping partners); it excludes apprentices or students engaged in vocational training 
with an apprenticeship or vocational training contract, and any periods or maternity or parental leave. 
2 An autonomous enterprise is defined by exclusion: one that is not a linked enterprise or a partner enterprise. 
Generally, an enterprise is autonomous if it has holding of less than 25% of the capital or voting rights in one or 
more enterprises and/or other enterprises do not have a stake of 25% or more of the capital voting rights in the 
enterprise. 
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account data are already included through account consolidation.3 For further details of the European 
Commission’s recommendations for SME definition, see Recommendations 1996/280/EC and 
2003/361/EC.  
A.2 UK R&D Tax Relief Scheme 
The UK R&D Tax Relief Scheme includes a SME Scheme and a Large Company (“LCO”) 
Scheme.4 Since its introduction in 2000 up until 2012, more than 28,500 different companies had made 
claims under the SME Scheme, and over 7,000 under the Large Company Scheme, claiming more than 
£9.5bn in total R&D support. The annual amount of R&D support had risen to over £1bn by 2008, 
reaching £1.4bn in 2012, and covering qualifying R&D expenditure worth £13.2bn (HMRC Research 
and Development Tax Credit Statistics, 2014). 
Both SME and Large Company Schemes are volume-based, i.e. the tax relief accrues on the total 
R&D spending rather than the incremental R&D over a prior base (the main US tax credit scheme is 
incremental). It works mostly through enhanced deduction of current R&D expenditure from taxable 
income, thus reducing R&D-performing companies’ corporate tax liabilities.5 In addition, under the SME 
Scheme, a company that has taxable loss after the additional deduction can also claim payable tax credit 
up to the amount of payable credit rate × enhanced qualifying R&D expenditure.6 This payable tax credit 
can only be used to reduce the company’s PAYE (Pay-As-You-Earn) or NIC (National Insurance 
Contributions) liabilities. Alternatively, the company (either as an SME or as a large company) can choose 
to carry the loss forward as normal.7  
Qualifying R&D expenditure must be allowable as a deduction in calculating trading profits, 
which includes all flow costs, employee costs, staff providers, materials, payments to clinical trials 
volunteers, utilities, software, or subcontracted R&D expenditure (only if the contractor is an SME).8 To 
be eligible for R&D tax relief, a company must also spend at least £10,000 a year on qualifying R&D 
3 Linked enterprises are those in which one enterprise is able to exercise control, directly or indirectly, over the 
affairs of the other. 
4 For further details, see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD90000.htm (SME Scheme) and 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD85050.htm (Large Company Scheme). 
5 For example, if a company is allowed an enhancement rate of 75%, for each £100 of qualifying R&D expenditure 
it spends, it can deduct an additional £75 from its taxable income before calculating its tax liability. 
6 For example, if a company is allowed an enhancement rate of 75% and payable credit rate of 14%, spends £10,000 
in R&D, and has no taxable income before the additional deduction, it can claim payable tax credit of 0.14 ×
£10,000 × (1 + 0.75) = £2,450. If instead the company has £1,500 in taxable income before the additional 
deduction, it can first use £2,000 of its R&D to reduce its taxable income to zero (i.e. £1,500 = 75% x £2000, then 
claim payable tax credit of 0.14 ×  £8,000 × (1 + 0.75) = £1,960. This latter case is called a combination claim. 
7 A large company that has taxable loss before the additional deduction therefore may still benefit from R&D tax 
relief by carrying the “enhanced” loss forward to further reduce its taxable income in the next period. However, this 
reduction is only meaningful when the company has enough taxable income in this next period. 
8 Qualifying R&D expenditure could include R&D performed outside of the UK by foreign branches of UK holding 
companies, as foreign branches’ revenues and costs are directly consolidated into their UK holding companies’ tax 
revenues and costs for UK tax purpose. Qualifying R&D expenditure is unlikely to include R&D performed outside 
of the UK by foreign subsidiaries of UK holding companies, as foreign subsidiaries’ net profits are indirectly 
incorporated into their UK holding companies’ tax revenues as dividends for UK tax purpose instead. 
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expenditure in an accounting period. If an SME works as a subcontractor for a large company, only the 
subcontractor SME can claim R&D tax relief, under the Large Company Scheme.9 There is also an upper 
limit of €7.5m on the total amount of aid a company can receive for any one R&D project under the SME 
Scheme.10  
The evolution of the UK R&D Tax Relief Scheme is summarized in Table A1. It was first 
introduced in April 2000 only for SMEs (Finance Act 2000), then later extended to large companies 
starting from April 2002 (Finance Act 2002).11 Between April 2000 and December 2004, the UK followed 
Recommendation 1996/280/EC for SME definition, which set the ceilings for staff headcount, assets, and 
sales at 249, €27m, and €40m respectively. From January 2005, the UK adopted Recommendation 
2003/361/EC and accordingly increased its SME ceilings to 249, €43m, and €50m. Throughout the period 
from April 2000 (April 2002) to March 2008, the enhancement rates were set at 50% for SMEs and 25% 
for large companies, and the payable credit rate for SMEs was 16%.12  
As discussed in the main paper, the 2007 Finance Act introduced numerous changes to the 
scheme, in both SME eligibility thresholds and relief rates, which became effective at different points in 
2008.13 First, from April 2008, the enhancement rate for large companies was increased from 25% to 
30%. Then from August 2008, the enhancement rate for SMEs was increased from 50% to 75% and the 
payable credit rate for SMEs was reduced from 16% to 14% (to ensure that state aid intensity stays below 
25%). Also from August 2008, the SME Scheme was extended to “larger” SMEs as the SME ceilings 
were doubled to 499, €86m, and €100m for staff headcount, assets, and sales respectively. This change 
in SME definition is applicable only for the purpose of the R&D tax relief and therefore is the main focus 
of our paper, as it allows us to separate the impacts of the R&D Tax Relief Scheme from other programs. 
It should also be noted that even though these new SME ceilings were announced in Finance Act 2007, 
the date on which they became effective (August 1st 2008) was appointed much later, in July 2008.14        
There were tweaks to the system in 2011 and 2012. From April 2011, the SME enhancement rate 
was increased to 100% and the SME payable credit rate was reduced to 12.5%. From April 2012, the 
SME enhancement rate was again increased to 125%. However, the SME definition as announced in 
9 An SME already receiving another form of notified state aid for a project cannot claim R&D tax relief for that 
same project under the SME Scheme (which is also a notified state aid), as total state aid intensity cannot exceed 
25% under European Commission’s State Aid rules. However, from April 2003 onward, SMEs were allowed to 
claim R&D tax relief for such projects under the Large Company Scheme. 
10 In practice, most companies prefer R&D Tax Relief’s SME Scheme over other notified state aids, as the scheme 
is sufficiently generous (the maximum relief intensity under the SME Scheme is close to 25%) and is straightforward 
to apply for. For further details on other conditions, see 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cirdmanual/CIRD81000.htm.  
11 Finance Act 2000 (Chapter 17, Schedule 20) and Finance Act 2002 (Chapter 23, Schedule 12). 
12 One exception to this differential treatment of SMEs and large companies was the Vaccine Research Relief 
Scheme (VRR) launched in April 2003, which extended the higher 50% additional allowance to cover specific areas 
of vaccine and drug research conducted in large companies (Finance Act 2003, Chapter 14, Schedule 31). The VRR 
enhancement rate was later reduced to 40% from August 2008 onward. 
13 Finance Act 2007 (Chapter 11). 
14 Finance Act 2007, Section 50 (Appointed Day) Order 2008 of July 16th 2008. 
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Finance Act 2007 and the large company enhancement rate of 30% remained unchanged throughout this 
period. 
A.3 Model of R&D demand 
Consider a CES production function in R&D capital (𝐺) and non-R&D capital (𝑍). If input 
markets are competitive we can write the long-run static first order condition for relative factor demand 
of the firm as: 
ln 𝐺 =  −𝜎 ln 𝜌 + 𝜎 ln 𝑈 + ln 𝑍 + 𝐵 
where 𝜌 is the user cost of R&D capital, 𝑈 is is the user cost of non-R&D capital and 𝐵 are technological 
constants representing factor bias terms in the production function. Assume that 𝐺 can be described by 
the perpetual inventory formula 𝐺𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑡 with rdt the R&D expenditure in period t. Since
in steady state, the R&D just offsets the depreciated part of the R&D stock 𝛿𝐺 = 𝑟𝑑, we can re-write the 
first order condition as: 
ln 𝑟𝑑 =  −σ ln 𝜌 + σ ln 𝑈 + ln 𝑍 + ln 𝛿 + B 
This is essentially the equation we estimate in equation (1). Around the R&D SME threshold the user 
cost of non-R&D capital and technology are smooth. Non-R&D capital (assets) is the running variable 
so we have a polynomial approximation to lnZ. The only departure from this first-order condition is that 
we cannot estimate R&D in logarithms because of the presence of firms who don’t do any R&D, so we 
estimate the left hand side in levels instead of logs. To obtain the proportionate change in R&D we use 
the empirical averages of lagged R&D spending in the pre-policy change period (or explicitly condition 
on the firm’s lagged R&D). We also show that the calculations are robust to using a Poisson regression 
whose first moment is the exponential log-link function and so is equivalent to estimating in logarithms.  
A.4 Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D 
The full formula for tax-adjusted user cost of R&D as described in sub-section 5.2 is: 
𝜌𝑡,𝑓 = (Pr(𝐻𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) ×
(1 − 𝜏𝑡(1 + 𝑒𝑡,𝑓))
(1 − 𝜏𝑡)
+ Pr(𝑁𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) × (1 − 𝑐𝑡,𝑓(1 + 𝑒𝑡,𝑓)))  ×  (𝑟 +  𝛿) 
where 𝜏 is the effective corporate tax rate, 𝑒 is the enhancement rate, 𝑐 is the payable credit rate, 𝑟 is the 
real interest rate, 𝛿 is the depreciation rate, 𝑡 denotes year, and 𝑓 denotes the whether the company is an 
SME or a large company. Note that 𝜌𝑡,𝑓 varies over time with 𝜏𝑡, 𝑒𝑡,𝑓, and 𝑐𝑡,𝑓.
For simplicity, we do not consider the possibility that a loss-making large company may still 
benefit from R&D tax relief by carrying the “enhanced” loss forward to reduce its taxable income in the 
next period, as this reduction is only meaningful if the company makes enough profits in this next period. 
This simplification may overestimate large companies’ tax-adjusted user cost of R&D and, as a result, 
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underestimate R&D tax-price elasticity (by overestimating the difference in tax-adjusted user cost of 
R&D between SMEs and large companies). We also do not consider combination claims (cases in which 
an SME combines tax deduction with payable tax credit as described in footnote 6 of sub-section A.2), 
as there are almost none of them in our baseline sample. 
The evolution of tax adjusted user costs of R&D for SMEs and large companies over time is 
summarized in Table A11. For large companies (for which payable credit rate is always zero), slight 
decreases in corporate tax rate over 2006-12 (from 30% to 28% to 26%) coupled with slight increases in 
enhancement rate (from 25% to 30%) over the same period result in a relatively stable tax-adjusted user 
cost of 0.190 throughout this period. It is therefore reasonable to use the baseline sample’s average R&D 
over 2006-08 as a proxy for how much an average firm in the baseline sample would spend on R&D if it 
remained a large company over 2009-11, after the policy change. For SMEs, large increases in 
enhancement rate (from 50% to 75% to 100%) more than offset the slight decrease in corporate tax rate 
and payable credit rate (from 16% to 14% to 12.5%), leading to a steady reduction in SMEs’ tax-adjusted 
user cost of R&D from 0.154 in 2006 to 0.141 in 2011. This widens the difference in tax-adjusted user 
cost of R&D between SMEs and large companies over time, from an average log difference of -0.219 
over 2006-08 to an average log difference of -0.271 over 2009-11. 
Finally, as a robustness check, we also consider using the small profit rate (from 19% to 21% to 
20% over 2006-11) instead of the main rate for corporate tax rate. As the tax deduction is less generous 
with a lower corporate tax rate, the resulting tax-adjusted user cost in the tax deduction case is higher for 
both SMEs and large companies and their gap is smaller in magnitude (average log difference over 2006-
08 is -0.185 and over 2009-11 is -0.229). 
A.5 Cost effectiveness analysis of R&D Tax Relief Scheme 
A full welfare analysis of the R&D Tax Relief Scheme requires both an analysis of the benefits 
in terms of (say) the increased GDP generated by the R&D induced by the policy (including spillovers) 
and the deadweight cost of taxation. We would also need to take a position on other general equilibrium 
effects such as the increase in the wages of R&D workers due to increased demand (Goolsbee, 1998). As 




where ∆𝑅𝐷 is the amount of R&D induced by the policy and ∆𝐸𝐶 is the total amount of
additional taxpayer money needed to pay for the scheme (which we call “Exchequer Cost”, EC). 
A.5.1 2008 extension of the SME Scheme 
With respect to the 2008 extension of the SME Scheme to cover “larger” SMEs, ∆𝑅𝐷 measures
the increase in R&D induced by more generous tax relief under the SME scheme by a firm benefitting 
from the scheme thanks to the new thresholds. That is, ∆𝑅𝐷= 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 where 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 and 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑
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are the firm’s R&D’s under the new and old policies respectively. Similarly, ∆𝐸𝐶= 𝐸𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 where
𝐸𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 and 𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 are the firm’s corresponding Exchequer costs due to the policy change.











where 𝜌 is the tax-adjusted user cost of R&D. For simplicity, we consider the tax deduction case and the 
payable tax credit case separately. 
SME Tax deduction case 
In this case, 
𝜌𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
(1 − 𝜏(1 + 𝑒))
1 − 𝜏
(𝑟 + 𝛿) 
𝐸𝐶𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑅𝐷 × 𝑒 × 𝜏
where 𝜏 is the effective corporate tax rate, 𝑒 is the enhancement rate, 𝑟 is the real interest rate, and 𝛿 is 
the depreciation rate. As the above firm moves from being a large company pre-2008 to being an SME 
post-2008, its enhancement rate increases from 25% to 75%. At the same time, corporate tax rate 
decreases from 30% to 28%. Combining 𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0.25, 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 0.75, 𝜏𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0.30, 𝜏𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 0.28 with
estimated R&D tax-price elasticity of 𝜂 =  −2.63 gives ln (
𝜌𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝜌𝑜𝑙𝑑
) = −0.23 and 
𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑
= 1.84. That is, 
R&D increases by 84% in response to a 23% reduction in its log user cost. 
On the cost side, we have 
𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 𝜏𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 0.075
𝐸𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 × 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤 × 𝜏𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 × 0.21.







(𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 1.84) − 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑





so the value for money ratio in the tax deduction case is 2.70. In other words, £1 of taxpayer money 
generates £2.70 in additional R&D. 
Finally, note that ∆𝐸𝐶  could be rewritten as
∆𝐸𝐶= 𝐸𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 × 0.21 − 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 0.075 = Δ𝑅𝐷 × 0.21 + 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × (0.21 − 0.075)
where the first element represents the Exchequer costs associated with new R&D and the second term 
reflects additional Exchequer costs paid on existing R&D due to more generous tax relief. In this case, 
the majority of the additional costs are because of the new R&D generated, i.e. Δ𝑅𝐷 × 0.21 = 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 ×
0.18 makes up close to 60% of ∆𝐸𝐶  (∆𝐸𝐶= 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 0.31).
SME Payable tax credit case 
In this case, 
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𝜌𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝑐(1 + 𝑒))(𝑟 +  𝛿)
𝐸𝐶𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷 × 𝑐 × (1 + 𝑒)
where 𝑐 – the payable credit rate – is always zero for large companies and 14% for SMEs post-2008. 







= 2.09 (i.e. R&D increases by 109% in response to a 28% reduction in its log user cost). On 
the cost side, 𝐸𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 0 and 𝐸𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 × 𝑐𝑛𝑒𝑤 × (1 + 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤) =  𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 × 0.25. Putting all the







𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 2.09 − 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑





The value for money ratio in the payable tax credit case is 2.13. In this case, the amount of additional 
R&D’s Exchequer costs due to newly-generated R&D Δ𝑅𝐷 × 0.25 = 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 0.27 constitutes more than
50% of ∆𝐸𝐶  (∆𝐸𝐶= 𝑅𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 × 0.51).
A.5.2 R&D Tax Relief Scheme over 2006-11 




𝑅𝐷𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 − 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓
𝐸𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 − 𝐸𝐶𝑛𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 
=
𝑅𝐷𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 − 𝑅𝐷𝑛𝑜 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓
𝐸𝐶
separately for each of three cases, SME tax deduction case (Table A13, Panel B), SME payable tax credit 
case (Panel C), and large company tax deduction case (Panel D), in each of the years using the same 
approach as described in detail above. We generalize our estimated tax-price elasticity of 2.6 to the whole 
population of SMEs, but use a more conservative tax-price elasticity of 1.0 for the population of large 
companies as these firms are less likely to be credit constrained and therefore less responsive to tax 
incentives. In addition, we use the small profits rate (19%-21%) instead of the regular corporate tax rate 
(26%-30%) for the population of SMEs as most of them are much smaller than the “larger” SMEs in our 
baseline sample and therefore most likely qualify for the small profits rate.  
As reported in Table A13, the SME tax deduction’s value for money ratio decreases from 2.9 in 
2006 to 2.7 in 2011 as SME tax deduction becomes significantly more generous over time. On the other 
hand, SME payable tax credits and large company tax deduction’s value for money ratios are stable at 
around 2.1 and 1.4 respectively as these schemes do not change much over this period. The fact that all 
the value for money ratios are well above unity indicates that the R&D Tax Relief Scheme is effective in 
inducing additional R&D at relatively low cost to the Exchequer. 




× 𝐸𝐶 using the calculated value for money ratios 
∆𝑅𝐷
∆𝐸𝐶
 and Exchequer costs national statistics 
(HMRC 2015). We do this for each of the three schemes in Panels B, C and D and then aggregate them 
together in Panel D.  
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To give an example, consider the SME tax deduction case in Panel B for 2009. The user cost is 
calculated using the policy parameters given, i.e. 
1−0.21×(1+0.75)
1−0.21
(0.05 + 0.15) = 0.160. This compares 
to a user cost of 0.20 =  0.05 +  0.15 in the counterfactual world without any tax relief (e = 0). The log 



















) ( 1 −
1
exp(2.63×0.2223)
)  =  2.811 as in the second row of Table A13 Panel B. From HMRC 
data we know that £130m was paid out in the SME deduction in this year. Hence, we can calculate that 
the total amount of additional R&D induced was £365𝑚 =  130 × 2.811 (fourth row of Panel B).  
As discussed in sub-section 5.4, our estimates suggest that the overall impact of the R&D Tax 
Relief Scheme is large in Panel E. Over 2006-11, the policy, which costs less than £6 billion in lost tax 
revenue, induced close to £10 billion in additional R&D. On an annualized basis, spending £0.96b 
produced £1.64b of additional R&D. 
These calculations show our estimates of what the counterfactual path of R&D would have been 
in the absence of the R&D Tax Relief Scheme. The bottom row of Table A13 gives the yearly breakdown. 
For example, the final column shows that on average 2006-11 we estimate that R&D would be a full 16% 
lower in the absence of the tax scheme.  
It is important to note that throughout our analysis we have been focusing on qualifying R&D, 
i.e. that part of business R&D that is eligible for tax relief. Aggregate qualifying R&D is lower than the 
figures for Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) reported in Figure 4. For example, in 2011 aggregate 
BERD was £17bn and aggregate qualifying R&D was £12bn. There are various reasons for this 
difference, including the fact that BERD includes R&D spending on capital investment whereas qualified 
R&D does not (only current expenses are liable). It is also the case that HMRC defines R&D more 
narrowly for tax purposes that BERD which is based on Frascati definition.  
We present counterfactual BERD to GDP ratios in Figure 4. To calculate the counterfactual (the 
dotted line “UK without tax relied” in Figure 4) we simply deduct the additional qualified R&D that we 
estimate were created by the R&D tax relief system (Table A13, Panel D “Total Additional R&D”) from 
the aggregate BERD numbers from OECD MSTI Dataset 
(https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB). Since BERD is greater than qualifying 
R&D, the 16% fall in qualifying R&D translates to about a 10% fall in BERD. 
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Appendix B: Data 
B.1 CT600 dataset 
The CT600 dataset is constructed by the UK tax authority (HMRC) and is a confidential panel 
dataset of corporate tax returns or assessments made from the returns for the universe of companies that 
file a corporate tax return in the UK. We can only access the dataset from within an HMRC facility 
(similar to a US Census Bureau Research Data Center) and merging with other datasets requires approval 
from HMRC. It is currently not possible to merge CT600 with other government secured datasets 
available at different facilities.15 The CT600 dataset covers all accounting periods whose end dates fall 
between April 1st 2001 and March 31st 2012 and consists of all information on the UK Company Tax 
Return form (which is called the CT600 form). Specifically, an extension of CT600, the Research and 
Development Tax Credits (RDTC) dataset, provides detailed information on tax relief claims. However, 
CT600 contains little information on financial statement variables (e.g. assets and employment are not 
included) as they are not directly required on corporate tax forms.  
 We convert the original observation unit of firm by accounting period in CT600 to firm by 
financial year by aggregating all accounting periods the end dates of which fall in the same financial 
year.16 This conversion affects a very small number of observations as only 3% of our firm by year 
observations are aggregates of multiple accounting periods. Our converted dataset then contains 15.7 
million firm by year observations over 12 financial years from 2000 to 2011 (covering 3.2 million firms), 
including 9.1 million firm by year observations over our study period from 2006 to 2011 (covering 2.5 
million firms).  
Our key variables of interest are those related to firms’ R&D tax relief claims from CT600’s 
RDTC dataset, which include the amount of qualifying R&D expenditure each firm has in each year and 
the scheme under which it makes the claim (SME vs. Large Company Scheme). These variables, 
originally self-reported by firms on their CT600 forms, have been further validated and corrected by 
HMRC staff using additional tax processing data available only within the tax authority. It should also be 
noted that R&D tax relief variables are only available for R&D-tax-relief-claiming firms for the years in 
which they make the claims. While it is possible to infer that non-claiming firms have zero qualifying 
R&D expenditure, it is not possible to construct their precise SME eligibility without full information on 
employment, assets (balance sheet total), sales, and ownership structure. 
Table B1 shows that over our study period between 2006 and 2011, we observe claims in 53,491 
firm by year observations (by 20,730 firms), 81% of which are under the SME Scheme. The total 
qualifying R&D expenditure and estimated Exchequer costs under the SME Scheme are in nominal terms 
15 For example, it is currently not possible to merge CT600 with the BERD firm survey which is used to build the 
national estimate of R&D. 
16 Financial year t begins on April 1st of year t and ends on March 31st of year t+1. So the last year that is currently 
available to use is 2011. 
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£11.2bn and £1.8bn respectively; the corresponding figures under the Large Company Scheme are 
£48.5bn and £3.9bn (excluding claims by SME subcontractors). These figures are in line with the official 
R&D Tax Relief Scheme statistics released in HMRC (2014). 
We also use the data on sales and on investment in plant and machinery from CT600. Sales are 
reported for 93% of firm by year observations and annualized to account for different accounting period 
lengths. CT600 tax-accounting sales, which is calculated using the cash-based method, is not the same as 
financial-accounting sales (reported in the FAME data – see below), which is calculated using the accrual 
method and used to determine SME eligibility.17 However, CT600 sales provides a good measure for 
firms’ growth and performance, given its relatively wide coverage.  
B.2 FAME dataset 
FAME is a database of UK companies provided by Bureau Van Dijk. The panel dataset contains 
companies’ balance sheet and income statement data from companies’ annual accounts filed at the UK 
company registry (Companies House), together with additional information on addresses and industry 
codes. Like other countries, UK regulations for reporting accounting variables vary with company size, 
so some balance sheet and income statement variables are missing – we discuss the implications of this 
below.18   
Our FAME dataset also covers 12 financial years from 2000 to 2011 and contains 19.6 million 
firm by year observations (covering 3.8 million firms), including 11.5 million firm by year observations 
over our study period from 2006-11 (covering 3.1 million firms). Our key SME-eligibility variable from 
FAME (for R&D tax relief purpose) is total assets (i.e. balance sheet total). As almost all UK companies 
are required by the Companies House to send in their balance sheets (either full or simplified) for their 
annual accounts regardless of their size, total assets coverage in FAME is close to complete, at 97% over 
our study period of 2006-11. On the other hand, sales (financial-accounting sales used to determine SME 
eligibility) is reported by only 15%, as smaller firms are not required to provide their income statements.19 
The proportion of firms who report employment is even lower at 5%, as employment reporting is not 
mandatory. Even in our baseline sample of relatively larger firms (i.e. firms with total assets in 2007 
between €61m and €111m), the proportion of firms who report sales is 67% and the proportion who report 
employment is 55%. For this reason, while we do use FAME sales and employment as running variables 
17 The cash-based method focuses on actual cash receipts rather than their related sales transactions. The accrual 
methods records sale revenues when they are earned, regardless of whether cash from sales has been collected. 
18 All UK limited companies, public limited companies (PLC), and limited liability partnerships (LLP) are required 
to file annual accounts with the Companies House. An annual accounts should generally include a balance sheet, 
an income statement, a director’s report, and an audit report. However, smaller companies may be exempt from 
sending in income statement, director’s report, or audit report. All UK registered companies are required to file 
annual returns with the Companies House, which contain information on registered address and industry codes. 
19 Small companies (those having any 2 of the following: (1) sales of £6.5m or less, (2) assets of £3.26m or less, (3) 
50 employees or less) are only required to send in balance sheets. Micro-entities (those having any 2 of the 
following: (1) sales of £632,000 or less, (2) assets of £316,000 or less, (3) 10 employees or less) are only required 
to send in simplified balance sheets. 
11 
in some alternative specifications, our baseline sample and key results are derived using total assets as 
the running variable. 
Besides total assets, sales, and employment, other FAME variables used in our paper include 
primary industry code (UK 4-digit SIC), register address postcode, and fixed assets as a proxy for capital 
stock.  
B.3 PATSTAT dataset 
Our patent data are drawn from the World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) maintained 
by the European Patent Office (EPO).20 PATSTAT is the largest international patent database available 
to the research community and includes nearly 70 million patent documents from over 60 patent offices, 
including all of the major offices such as the United States Patent and Trademark office (USPTO), the 
Japan patent office (JPO) and the Chinese Patent and Trademark Office (SIPO) in addition to the EPO. 
Therefore, PATSTAT data cover close to the population of all worldwide patents since the 1980s.  
PATSTAT reports the name and address of patent applicants, which allows matching individual 
patents with company databases. The matching between PATSTAT and FAME is implemented by 
Bureau Van Dijk and is available as part of the ORBIS online platform through a commercial agreement. 
The quality of the matching is excellent: over our sample period, 94% of patents filed in the UK and 96% 
of patents filed at the EPO have been matched with their owning company.  
A patent is a legal title protecting an invention. To be patented, a product or process must be new, 
involve an inventive step and be susceptible of industrial application. Patents grant their owner a set of 
rights of exclusivity over an invention. The legal protection conferred by a patent gives its owner the right 
to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing the patented invention for 
the term of the patent, which is usually 20 years from the filing date, and in the country or countries where 
the patent has been filed (and subsequently granted). In addition to the financial and administrative costs 
of filing, there is a mandatory public disclosure of the description of the technology, which makes 
imitation easier and facilitates future technological developments.  
To make things clearer, consider a simplified invention process. In the first stage, an inventor 
discovers a new technology. She then decides where to market this invention and how to protect the 
intellectual property associated with it. A patent in country i grants her an exclusive right to commercially 
exploit the invention in that country. Accordingly, she will patent her invention in country i if she plans 
to market it there. The set of patents in different countries related to the same invention is called a patent 
family. The vast majority of patent families include only one patent (usually in the home country of the 
inventor). Importantly, PATSTAT reports not only the unique identifier of each patent application, it also 
indicates a unique patent family indicator for each patent (we use the DOCDB patent family indicator). 
20 For further details see http://www.epo.org/searching/subscription/raw/product-14-24.html. 
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This allows us to identify all patent applications filed worldwide by UK-based companies and to avoid 
double-counting inventions that are protected in several countries. 
In this study, our primary measure of innovation is the number of patent families – irrespective 
of where the patents are filed. This proxies for the number of inventions a firm makes. This means that 
we count the number of patents filed anywhere in the world by firms in our sample, be it at the UK 
Intellectual Property Office, at the European Patent Office, at the USPTO or anywhere else, but we use 
information on patent families to make sure that any invention patented in several places is only counted 
once. Patents are sorted by the first year they were filed (the priority year). 
We use fractional counts to account for multiple applicants. For example, if two firms jointly 
apply for a patent, then each firm is attributed one half of a patent. In practice, 8% of patents filed by UK-
based companies are filed jointly by at least two companies. 
There are many well-known issues with patents as a measure of innovation. As noted above, not 
all inventions are patented, although it is reasonable to assume the most valuables are, so counting patents 
screens out many of the low value inventions. Nevertheless, since patents are of very heterogeneous 
importance we use several approaches to examine how our results change when looking at patent quality. 
First, we distinguish between patents filed at the UK patents office and patents files at the EPO. 21 Since 
the financial and administrative cost is about six times higher at the EPO than UK patent office, EPO 
patents will, on average be of higher perceived private value. It is also worth noting that the EPO has not 
experienced the same explosion of low value patents that the US has suffered since the late 1980s (Jaffe 
and Lerner, 2004)  
A second measure of patent quality is the size of patent families, the number of jurisdictions in 
which each patent is filed. There is evidence that the number of jurisdictions in which a patent is filed is 
an indicator of its economic value as patenting is costly (see Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000, and 
Harhoff et al., 2003). A third measure of quality is to distinguish by technology class, as some classes 
(e.g. pharmaceuticals) are likely to be more valuable than others (e.g. business process methods). Fourth, 
we use patent citations, also available from PATSTAT. For each patent in the database, we know how 
many times it was cited by subsequent patents (excluding self-citations). We use the number of 
subsequent citations (referred to as forward citations) as a measure of value. Again, this measure is well 
rooted in the patent literature (Squicciarini et al., 2013, Hall et al., 2005, Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2004) 
In PATSTAT, patents are categorized based on the International Patent Classification (IPC). We 
use IPC codes at three-digit level to construct measures of the technological distance between firms used 
to investigate spillover effects.  
21 Note that because of differences in the “technological scope” of patents across patent offices, two patents filed in 
the UK may be “merged” into a single patent filed at the EPO. In this case, these three patents will constitute a 
single patent family and the number of patent families is smaller than the number of UK patents. This configuration 
happens very rarely, however. 
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B.4 Sample construction: merging datasets 
CT600 was merged with FAME using an HMRC-anonymized version of company registration 
number (CRN), which is a unique regulatory identifier in both datasets. 95% of CT600 firms between 
2006 and 2011 also appear in FAME, covering close to 100% of R&D performing firms and 100% percent 
of patenting firms in this period.22 Unmatched firms are slightly smaller but not statistically different from 
matched ones across different variables reported in CT600, including sales, gross trading profits, and 
gross and net corporate tax chargeable.23 Furthermore, that the match rate is less than 100% is due to 
CRN entering error in FAME, which happens more often among firms that are much smaller than those 
around SME-eligibility thresholds.24 For these reasons, we believe sample selection due to incomplete 
matching between CT600 and FAME is unlikely to be an issue for us.25  
PATSTAT has been merged with FAME by BVD. As PATSAT comprehensively covers all UK 
patenting firms, we can safely infer that non-matched firms have zero patents. Over our study period of 
2006-11, 9,420 out of 2.5 million CT600 firms claim a total of 46,405 patent families (in 17,293 firm by 
year observations), including 23,617 higher-quality EPO patents. These patents cover 90% of the total 
recorded in PATSTAT.   
From the merged master dataset, we construct our baseline sample based on total assets in 2007, 
as it is our key running variable. Specifically, our baseline sample includes 5,888 firms that satisfy the 
two following conditions: (1) the firm’s total assets in 2007 is between €61m and €111m (within €25m 
below and above the SME threshold of €86m), and (2) the firm appears in CT600 in 2008 or after (to 
exclude firms exiting before the policy change in 2008). Baseline sample descriptive statistics are 
summarized in Tables 1 and A2 and discussed in detail in sub-section 4.2.  
B.5 Variable construction 
As FAME total assets and sales are reported in sterling while the corresponding SME ceilings 
are set in euros, we convert sterling to euros using the exact same rule used by HMRC for tax purposes. 
That is, the conversion should be done using the exchange rate on the last day of the relevant accounting 
period or the average daily exchange rate throughout that accounting period, whichever is more beneficial 
22 Out of 2,495,944 firms present in CT600 between 2006 and 2011, 2,358,948 firms are matched to FAME (94.5% 
match rate). Over the same period, 20,627 out of 20,730 R&D-performing firms and 9,376 out of 9,420 patenting 
firms are matched to FAME (99.5% match rate). 
23 Differences (standard errors) between matched and unmatched firms in sales (£’000), gross trading profits (£), 
gross corporate tax chargeable (£) and net corporate tax chargeable (£) are 970 (3,286), 8,969 (13,703), 3,497 (3,898) 
and 1,961 (2,291) respectively. None of these differences are statistically significant at conventional level. 
24 Because of confidentiality concerns, we do not get to work directly with CRNs but an anonymized version of 
CRNs provided by the HMRC Datalab for both FAME and CT600 datasets. This prevents us from further cleaning 
and matching of initially unmatched firms due to above issue.  
25 The correlation between ln(sales) in CT600 and ln(sales) FAME is 0.90. As noted above, the variables are not 
measured in the same way, but the fact that their correlation is high is reassuring that the match has been performed 
well. 
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for the enterprise. The daily exchange rate is obtained from the OECD, exactly the same method as used 
by HMRC.  
For qualifying R&D expenditure, we do not include the amounts claimed by SME subcontractors, 
which do not benefit from more generous reliefs under the SME Scheme. Since SME subcontracting 
makes up only a small portion of the overall R&D Tax Relief Scheme, we believe excluding SME 
subcontracting does not materially affect our key findings. To account for price differences across years, 
we also convert nominal values of R&D expenditure to their real values in 2007 price, using UK annual 
CPI as reported in the World Bank Economic Indicators database.26 
We address the presence of outliers in R&D spending or patenting by winsorizing our key 
outcome variables, which include qualifying R&D expenditure and number of all patents as well as 
number of UK patents, EPO patents and patent families. Specifically, for each variable, the top 2.5% of 
non-zero values in each year within the sample of firms with 2007 total assets between €46m and €126m 
are set to the corresponding 97.5 percentile value (i.e. winsorization at 2.5% of non-zero values). This 
translates into “winsorizing” the R&D of top 5-6 R&D spenders and the number of patents of top 2-4 
patenters in the baseline sample in each year. It should be noted that our key findings are robust to 
alternative choices of winsorization window (e.g. 1% or 5% instead of 2.5%), or to excluding outliers 
instead of winsorizing outcome variables. 
Construction of other variables is generally in the notes to tables. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
is calculated as ln(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) −  (1−∝𝑙)ln(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) − ∝𝑙 ln(𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) , where ∝𝑙 is the share of labor
costs in total revenue at the two-digit industry level across all firms in the FAME dataset averaged across 
the 2006-2011 period. Sales are taken from CT600 and capital is fixed assets from FAME. Firm TFP is 
measured relative to the mean TFP in the two-digit industry. 
26 Ratios of current-£ to 2007-£ derived using UK annual CPI are 1.023 for 2006, 1.000 for 2007, 0.965 for 2008, 
0.945 for 2009, 0.915 for 2010, and 0.875 for 2011.  
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2000 April 249 €27m €40m 50% 0% 16% 0% 
Expenditure that incurred on or after 
April 1st 2000 
2002 April " " " " 25% " " 
Expenditure that incurred on or after 
April 1st 2002 
2005 January " €43m €50m " " " " 
Accounting period that ended on or 




499 €86m €100m 75% 30% 14% " 
Large companies: expenditure that 
incurred on or after April 1st 2008 
SMEs: expenditure that incurred on 
or after August 1st 2008 
2011 April " " " 100% " 12.5% " 
Expenditure that incurred on or after 
April 1st 2011 
2012 April " " " 125% " " " 
Expenditure that incurred on or after 
April 1st 2012 
Note: To be considered an SME, a company must fall below the employment ceiling and either the total asset ceiling or the sales 
ceiling (“ceiling tests”). The measurements and account aggregation rules for employment, total assets, and sales are set 
according to 1996/280/EC (up to December 31st 2004) and 2003/361/EC (from January 1st 2005). A company loses (acquires) 
its SME status if it fails (passes) the ceiling tests over two consecutive accounting periods (two-year rule). An SME working as 
subcontractor for a large company can only claim under the Large Company Scheme. From April 2000 to March 2012, there 
was a minimum requirement of £10,000 in qualifying R&D expenditure for both SMEs and large companies.  
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Table A2. Baseline sample descriptive statistics, before and after policy change 
Subsample 
Firms with total assets in 
2007 b/w €61-86 million 
Firms with total assets in 
2007 b/w €86-111 million 
Difference b/w firms with 
total assets in 2007 
below vs. above €86 million 
Year 2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2011 2006-2008 2009-2010 
No. firms with qual. R&D exp. 140 160 84 94 
Avg. qual. R&D exp. (£ ’000) 4,413 4,807 7,850 6,954 -3,437 -2,147 
No. firms with patents 104 99 66 58 
Avg. patents 6.29 6.26 6.18 5.03 0.11 1.23 
No. firms with UK patents 95 91 58 53 
Avg. UK patents 8.97 8.18 8.70 6.66 0.27 1.52 
No. firms with EPO patents 72 54 44 37 
Avg. EPO patents 4.77 5.52 4.82 4.35 -0.05 1.17 
Total no. firms in the subsample 3,561 2,327 
Avg. qual. R&D exp. (£ ’000) 173.5 216.0 283.4 280.9 -109.9 -64.9 
Avg. patents 0.184 0.174 0.175 0.125 0.009 0.049 
Avg. UK patents 0.239 0.209 0.217 0.152 0.022 0.057 
Avg. EPO patents 0.097 0.084 0.091 0.069 0.006 0.015 
Note: The baseline sample includes 5,888 firms with total assets in 2007 between €61m and €111m. Total assets data come 
from FAME and are converted to € from £ using HMRC rule. Qualifying R&D expenditure comes from CT600 panel dataset 
and are converted to 2007 prices. Patent counts come from PATSTAT. 
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Table A3. Robustness checks for R&D regressions 
Panel A. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 














Below new SME asset 
threshold in 2007 
138.5** 171.2* 175.3 75.5** 82.0** 125.6** 107.4** 62.3 1.62*** 1.08*** 
(55.3) (87.4) (108.0) (37.6) (36.4) (61.2) (49.5) (38.4) (0.57) (0.54) 
Past qualifying R&D 
expenditure (£ ’000) 
0.66*** 0.89*** 
(0.08) (0.09) 
Polynomial controls 1st order  2nd order 3rd order  1st order 1st order  1st order 1st order 1st order  1st order 1st order 
Year of LDV      2007 2006-08 2007 
Fixed effects Year Industry Location Ind. x loc. 
Firms 17,664 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 4,502 5,768 4,466 5,888 5,888 
Panel B. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable R&D expenditure, 2009-11 average (£ ’000) 
Specification 
Alternative bandwidth 





Below asset dummy 
threshold (in 2007) 
43.6 77.9* 143.2** 182** 148.6** 151.9** 171.1** 103.2** 210.4** 
(43.5) (46.9) (58.4) (73.5) (57.8) (60.8) (68.1) (42.2) (88.9) 
Sample total assets 51-121m 56-116m 66-106m 71-101m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 
Kernel weight Epa Tri 
Winsorization window 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% no outliers 
Firms 8,818 7,255 4,615 3,384 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,884 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD design. The running variable is 
total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off 
(i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of running variable separately for each side of the threshold 
are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Panel A: Column 1 pools observations across 2009-11 with year dummies 
and standard errors clustered at firm level. Columns 2-3 control for second or third order polynomials of running variable. 
Columns 4-5 add lagged dependent variable controls. Columns 6-8 add industry (4-digit SIC), location (2-digit postcode), and 
industry x location (2-digit SIC x 1-digit postcode) fixed effects. Columns 9-10 use Poisson specification instead of OLS, without 
(column 9) and with (column 10) lagged dependent variable control. Panel B: Columns 1-4 use samples with different sample 
bandwidths around the threshold. Columns 5-6 use Epanechnikov or triangular kernel weights. Columns 7-9 use samples with 
different winsorization parameters or sample excluding outliers in R&D expenditure. 
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Table A4. Robustness checks for reduced-form patent regressions 
Panel A. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 














Below new SME asset 
threshold in 2007 
0.073*** 0.067 0.067 0.041** 0.043** 0.069* 0.075*** 0.092***  1.52*** 1.42** 
(0.026) (0.046) (0.054)  (0.021) (0.018) (0.035) (0.027) (0.031)  (0.50) (0.57) 
Past qualifying R&D 
expenditure (£ ’000) 
 0.738*** 0.811*** 
 (0.109) (0.010) 
Polynomial controls 1st order  2nd order 3rd order  1st order 1st order  1st order 1st order 1st order  1st order 1st order 
Year of LDV      2007 2006-08 2007 
Fixed effects Year Industry Location Ind. x loc. 
Firms 17,664 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 4,502 5,768 4,466 5,888 5,888 
Panel B. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable All patent count, 2009-11 average 
Specification 
Alternative bandwidth 





Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
0.045* 0.076*** 0.067** 0.071 0.071*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
(0.025) (0.027) (0.029) (0.049) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) 
Sample total assets 51-121m 56-116m 66-106m 71-101m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 
Kernel weight Epa Tri 
Winsorization window 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% no outliers 
Firms 8,818 7,255 4,615 3,384 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,884 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD design. The running variable is 
total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and 
above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of running variable separately for each 
side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Panel A: Column 1 pools observations across 2009-
11 with year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at firm level. Columns 2-3 control for second or third order polynomials 
of running variable. Columns 4-5 add lagged dependent variable controls. Columns 6-8 add industry (4-digit SIC), location (2-
digit postcode), and industry x location (2-digit SIC x 1-digit postcode) fixed effects. Columns 9-10 use Poisson specification 
instead of OLS, without (column 9) and with (column 10) lagged dependent variable control. Panel B: Columns 1-4 use samples 
with different sample bandwidths around the threshold. Columns 5-6 use Epanechnikov or triangular kernel weights. Columns 
7-9 use samples with different winsorization parameters or sample excluding outliers in R&D expenditure. 
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Table A5. Robustness checks for effects of R&D Tax Relief Scheme on patents (IV regressions) 
Panel A. 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 









Industry & location 
fixed effects 
Qual. R&D expenditure 
over 2009-11 (£ mill) 
0.530** 0.391 0.382 0.331 0.335* 0.549 0.702** 1.48* 
(0.254) (0.292) (0.336) (0.208) (0.194) (0.360) (0.354) (0.884) 
Past qualifying R&D 
expenditure (£ mill) 
0.635*** 0.708*** 
(0.125) (0.122) 
Polynomial controls 1st order 2nd order 3rd order 1st order 1st order 1st order 1st order 1st order 
Year of LDV 2007 2006-08 
Fixed effects Year Industry Location Ind. x loc. 
Observations 17,664 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 4,502 5,768 4,466 
Panel B. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable All patents filed, 2009-11 average 
Specification 
Alternative bandwidth 





R&D exp. (£ mill), 
2009-11 average 
1.03 0.978 0.465* 0.388 0.478** 0.464** 0.429** 0.711** 0.350* 
(1.07) (0.625) (0.250) (0.270) (0.234) (0.235) (0.210) (0.335) (0.179) 
Sample total assets 51-121m 56-116m 66-106m 71-101m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 61-111m 
Kernel weight Epa Tri 
Winsorization window 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% no outliers 
Firms 8,818 7,255 4,615 3,384 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,884 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. IV estimates based on the (fuzzy) RD design. Instrumental variable 
is the dummy whether total assets in 2007 is below €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m 
below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of the running variable (total 
assets in 2007) separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Panel A: Column 
1 pools observations across 2009-11 with year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at firm level. Columns 2-3 control for 
second or third order polynomials of running variable. Columns 4-5 add lagged dependent variable controls. Columns 6-8 add 
industry (4-digit SIC), location (2-digit postcode), and industry x location (2-digit SIC x 1-digit postcode) fixed effects. Panel 
B: Columns 1-4 use samples with different sample bandwidths around the threshold. Columns 5-6 use Epanechnikov or 
triangular kernel weights. Columns 7-9 use samples with different winsorization parameters or sample excluding outliers in 
R&D expenditure. 
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Table A6. Discontinuities in the probabilities of doing any R&D or filing any patents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Dependent  variable Dummy: R&D expenditure > 0 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
0.011 0.016* -0.0045 0.007 0.002 0.010 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Mean over 2006-08 0.021 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.030 0.031 
Dependent variable Dummy: All patent count > 0 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
0.006 0.009 0.0040 0.011* 0.008 0.012* 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Mean over 2006-08 0.021 0.020 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.015 
Firms 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD design. The running variable is total 
assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above 
the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of running variable separately for each side of 
the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Dependent variables are dummies indicating whether a firm 
has R&D expenditure or files patents during the corresponding year. 
Table A7. Heterogeneous effects of R&D Tax Relief Scheme by past R&D and patents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












pat. > 0 
Past all 
pat. = 0 
Past UK 
pat. > 0 
Past UK 
pat. = 0 
Past EPO 
pat. > 0 
Past EPO 
pat. = 0 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
2,775** 0.0 1.80*** 0.00 2.52*** 0.00 1.58** 0.00 
(1,134) (7.1) (0.66) (0.00) (0.91) (0.01) (0.61) (0.00) 
Mean over 2006-08 1,901 0.0 2.08 0.00 2.96 0.00 1.60 0.00 
Difference between having 
vs. not having R&D/patents 
2,775 1.80*** 2.52*** 1.58** 
(1,125) (0.65) (0.90) (0.60) 
Firms 224 5,664 170 5,718 153 5,735 116 5,772 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD design. The running variable is 
total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and 
above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of running variable separately for each 
side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
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Table A8. Heterogeneous effects of R&D Tax Relief Scheme by industry patenting intensity 
Panel A. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
204.6* 100.6 0.16** 0.02 0.21** 0.02 0.08* 0.01 
(106.3) (67.9) (0.06) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
Mean over 2006-08 117.0 22.3 0.12 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.01 
Difference between high vs. 
low patenting industries 
104.0 0.14** 0.19** 0.06 
(126.1) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) 
Firms 2,273 2,231 2,273 2,231 2,273 2,231 2,273 2,231 
Panel B. 




All patent count UK patent count EPO patent count 
Subsample High patent Low patent High patent Low patent High patent Low patent 
R&D expenditure  (£ million), 
2009-11 average 
0.803* 0.198 1.03* 0.187 0.374 0.119 
(0.478) (0.161) (0.604) (0.199) (0.249) (0.103) 
Firms 2,273 2,231 2,273 2,231 2,273 2,231 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Industry patenting intensity 
is calculated as the share of firms in the industry (at the 4-digit SIC level) having filed any patent before 2007. Panel A: OLS 
estimates based on the RD design. The running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. Baseline sample includes 
firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order 
polynomials of running variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Panel B: IV estimates based on the 
(fuzzy) RD design. Instrumental variable is the dummy whether total assets in 2007 is below €86m. Baseline sample includes 
firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order 
polynomials of RDD running variable (total assets in 2007) separately for each side of the threshold are included. 
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Table A9. Heterogeneous effects of R&D Tax Relief Scheme by firms’ past capital investments 
Panel A. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





All patent count UK patent count EPO patent count 
Sample industries 
Past 
inv. > 0 
Past 
inv. = 0 
Past 
inv. > 0 
Past 
inv. = 0 
Past 
inv. > 0 
Past 
inv. = 0 
Past 
inv. > 0 
Past 
inv. = 0 
Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
338.3*** -37.7 0.16*** 0.00 0.21*** 0.00 0.08** 0.00 
(113.9) (32.2) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
Mean over 2006-08 153.9 5.6 0.12 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.01 
Difference between high vs. 
low investment firms 
376.0*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.08** 
(118.4) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) 
Firms 2,655 3,042 2,655 3,042 2,655 3,042 2,655 3,042 
Panel B. 




All patent count UK patent count EPO patent count 
Subsample 
Past 
inv. > 0 
Past 
inv. = 0 
Past 
inv. > 0 
Past 
inv. = 0 
Past 
inv. > 0 
Past 
inv. = 0 
R&D expenditure (£ million), 
2009-11 average 
0.470** 0.034 0.611** 0.085 0.237** 0.037 
(0.202) (0.396) (0.262) (0.443) (0.113) (0.215) 
Firms 2,655 3,042 2,655 3,042 2,655 3,042 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Past capital investments is 
calculated as average machinery and plant investments over 2005-07. Panel A: OLS estimates based on the RD design. The 
running variable is total assets in 2007 with a threshold of €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within 
€25m below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of running variable 
separately for each side of the threshold are included. Panel B: IV estimates based on the RD design. Instrumental variable is 
the dummy whether total assets in 2007 is below €86m. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 2007 within €25m 
below and above the cut-off (i.e. between €61m and €111m). Controls for first order polynomials of RDD running variable (total 
assets in 2007) separately for each side of the threshold are included. 
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Table A10. Estimating impacts of R&D Tax Relief Scheme using other SME criteria 
Panel A. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 



















Below SME threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
138.5** 0.073*** 133.9** 0.035 133.0 0.109 77.2 0.120* 
(55.3) (0.026) (66.5) (0.050) (129.6) (0.071) (114.3) (0.062) 
Mean over 2006-08 72.3 0.060 105.2 0.083 176.9 0.114 197.6 0.141 
Treatment effect to 
baseline ratio 
1.92 1.22 1.27 0.42 0.75 0.96 0.39 0.85 
Sample 





[€50m, €150m] & 
total assets > €86m 
Employment in 
[300, 700] 
Firms 5,888 5,888 7,101 7,101 2,085 2,085 4,526 4,526 
Panel B. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















Below asset threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
87.3 0.114*** 73.6* 0.079*** 
(59.1) (0.042) (41.3) (0.026) 
Below sales threshold 
dummy (in 2007) 
126.5* 0.032 86.0** -0.005 
(66.4) (0.050) (43.0) (0.024) 




Mean over 2006-08 105.3 0.083 0.083 98.1 0.071 0.071 
Joint F-statistics (p-value) 2.43 (0.09) 4.04 (0.02) 2.52 (0.08) 5.47 (0.00) 
Sample Sales in [€50m, €150m] 
Total assets in [€61m, €111m] 
or sales in [€60m, €140m] 
Firms 7,091 7,091 7,091 8,120 8,120 8,120 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Robust standard errors are in brackets. Panel A: OLS estimates 
based on the RD design. The running variable in columns 1-2 is total assets in 2007 with threshold of €86m. The running 
variable in columns 3-6 is sales in 2007 with threshold of €100m. The running variable in columns 7-8 is employment in 2007 
with threshold of 500. Controls for first order polynomials of running variable separately for each side of the threshold are 
included. Panel B: OLS estimates based on the RD design for first-stage and reduced-form regressions (columns 1-2 and 4-5). 
IV estimates based on the (fuzzy) RD design where the instrumental variable is the dummy whether total assets in 2007 is below 
€86m (columns 3 and 6). The running variables are total assets in 2007 with threshold of €86m and sales in 2007 with threshold 
of €100m. Instrumental variable in columns 3 and 6 are the dummy whether total assets in 2007 is below €86m and the dummy 
whether sales in 2007 is below €100m. Controls for first order polynomials of the running variable (total assets in 2007 and sales 
in 2007) separately for each side of the respective threshold are included. Reported joint F-statistics for are for below-asset-
threshold dummy and below-sales-threshold dummy. 
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Table A11. Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital over time 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Tax relief scheme 
SME Large company Log diff. in 
user cost Deduction Payable credit Average Deduction Payable credit Average 
2006 0.157 0.152 0.154 0.179 0.200 0.190 -0.210 
2007 0.157 0.152 0.154 0.179 0.200 0.190 -0.210 
2008 0.147 0.151 0.149 0.177 0.200 0.190 -0.238 
2009 0.142 0.151 0.147 0.177 0.200 0.190 -0.255 
2010 0.142 0.151 0.147 0.177 0.200 0.190 -0.255 
2011 0.130 0.150 0.141 0.179 0.200 0.191 -0.302 
2006-2008 0.154 0.152 0.153 0.178 0.200 0.190 -0.219 
2009-2011 0.138 0.151 0.145 0.177 0.200 0.190 -0.271 
Note: Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital is calculated using formulae as described in sub-section 5.2. Corporate tax rate is 
30% in 2006-07, 28% in 2008-10, and 26% in 2011. Enhancement rate is 50% for SMEs and 25% for large companies in 2006-
08, 75% for SMEs and 30% for large companies in 2008-10, 100% for SMEs and 30% for large companies in 2011. Payable 
credit rate is 16% in 2006-08, 14% in 2008-10, and 12.5% in 2011. Share of the payable credit case is 55%. Real interest rate is 
5%. Depreciation rate is 15%.   
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Table A12. Tax-price elasticity of R&D investments using different approaches 
Approach 





Log diff. in 
R&D 




1 Treatment effect: discontinuity in increase in average 
R&D expenditure 3-year pre- compared to 3-year post-
policy change Difference(After - Before) 
£75k £72k 0.71 -0.27 -2.63 
Baseline R&D: average R&D expenditure 3-year pre-
policy change 2006-08 
2 Treatment effect: discontinuity in increase in average 
R&D expenditure 3-year pre- compared to 3-year post-
policy change Difference(After - Before) 
£75k £75k 0.69 -0.27 -2.56 
Baseline R&D: average R&D expenditure 2-year pre-
policy change 2006-07 
3 Treatment effect: discontinuity in average R&D 
expenditure over 2009-11, controlling for R&D in 2007 
£75k £47k 0.95 -0.27 -3.51 
Baseline R&D: predicted average R&D expenditure over 
2009-11 by a large company at the asset threshold €86m 
4 Specification: Poisson regression 1.08 -0.27 -3.97 
Treatment effect: discontinuity in average R&D 
expenditure over 2009-11, controlling for R&D in 2007 
5 Sample: firms with total assets in 2007 in [€66m, €106m] £288k £73k 0.79 -0.27 -2.91 
Treatment effect: discontinuity in increase in average 
R&D expenditure 3-year pre- compared to 3-year post-
policy change Difference(After - Before) 
Baseline R&D: average R&D expenditure 3-year pre-
policy change 2006-08 
6 Treatment effect: discontinuity in increase in average 
R&D expenditure 3-year pre- compared to 3-year post-
policy change Difference(After - Before) 
£75k £72k 0.71 -0.23 -3.11 
Baseline R&D: average R&D expenditure 3-year pre-
policy change 2006-08 
Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital: calculated using 
small profit rate instead of main rate for corporate tax rate 
Note: Log difference in R&D investments is calculated as ln(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑅&𝐷) − ln (𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑅&𝐷). 
Tax-price elasticity of R&D is calculated as 
ln (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)
ln (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑅&𝐷 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)
. Baseline sample includes firms with total 
assets in 2007 in in [€61m, €111m] unless indicated otherwise. Treatment effect used in approaches 1, 2 and 6 is reported in 
column 9 of Table 2. Treatment effects used in approaches 3 and 4 are reported in columns 4 and 9 of Table A3 Panel A 
respectively. Treatment effect used in approach 5 is estimated using same specification as in column 9 of Table 2 for the specified 
sample. Approaches 1 to 5 use the baseline log difference in tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital between SMEs and large 
companies as estimated in sub-section 5.2 and reported in Table A12. Approach 6 uses the same formulae as described in sub-
section 5.2 to calculate log difference in tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital, but using small profit rate (20% in 2006-07, 21% 
in 2008-10, and 20% in 2011) instead of main rate for corporate tax rate.  
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Table A13. Value for money analysis of R&D Tax Relief Scheme 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Average 
2006-11 
Panel A: Policy parameters 
SME enhancement rate 𝑒𝑆𝑀𝐸 50% 50% 67% 75% 75% 100% 
SME payable credit rate 𝑐𝑆𝑀𝐸 16% 16% 15% 14% 14% 12.5% 
SME effective corporate tax rate 𝜏𝑆𝑀𝐸 19% 19% 21% 21% 21% 20% 
LCO enhancement rate 𝑒𝐿𝐶𝑂 25% 25% 30% 30% 30% 30% 
LCO effective corporate tax rate 𝜏𝐿𝐶𝑂 30% 30% 28% 28% 28% 26% 
Panel B: SME tax deduction case 
   Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D  0.177 0.177 0.165 0.160 0.160 0.150 
Value for money ratio ∆𝑅𝐷 ∆𝐸𝐶⁄ 2.944 2.944 2.866 2.811 2.811 2.654 2.791 
   Exchequer costs (£m) 50 60 80 130 160 210 115 
   Additional R&D (£m) 147 177 229 365 450 557 321 
Panel C: SME payable tax credit case 
   Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D 0.152 0.152 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.150 
Value for money ratio ∆𝑅𝐷 ∆𝐸𝐶⁄ 2.142 2.142 2.134 2.133 2.133 2.123 2.134 
   Exchequer costs (£m) 150 180 190 190 190 220 187 
   Additional R&D (£m) 321 386 405 405 405 467 398 
Panel D: Large company tax deduction case 
   Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D 0.179 0.179 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.179 
Value for money ratio ∆𝑅𝐷 ∆𝐸𝐶⁄ 1.429 1.429 1.389 1.389 1.389 1.351 1.392 
   Exchequer costs (£m) 480 550 730 670 750 780 660 
   Additional R&D by LCOs (£m) 686 786 1,014 931 1,042 1,054 919 
Panel D: Aggregates 
  Total Exchequer costs (£m) 680 790 1,000 990 1,100 1,210 962 
  Total additional R&D (£m) 1,154 1,348 1,649 1,701 1,897 2,078 1,638 
  Value for money ratio 1.697 1.706 1.649 1.718 1.724 1.718 1.703 
  Total qualifying R&D (£m) 7,670 8,880 10,800 9,730 10,880 11,840 9,967 
  Fall of aggregate R&D without  policy 15% 15% 15% 17% 17% 18% 16% 
Note: Tax-adjusted user cost of R&D and value for money ratio are calculated using the formulae as described in Appendix A5 
using the above policy parameters. In addition, real interest rate is 5% and depreciation rate is 15%. Tax-adjusted user cost of 
R&D without any tax relief is calculated to be 0.200. Tax-price elasticity of R&D among SMEs is -2.63 as estimated in sub-
section 5.2. Tax-price elasticity of R&D among large companies is -1.00. Exchequer costs come from HMRC national statistics. 
Additional R&D is calculated as value for money ratios times Exchequer costs.  
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Table B1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Full CT600 dataset 
Unit 2006 2007 2008 2009 20210 2011 2006-11 
No. of firms Firm 1,406,696 1,487,173 1,484,311 1,504,927 1,564,871 1,646,641  2,495,944 
No. of firms claiming R&D relief Firm 6,431 7,429 8,334 9,144 10,150 12,003 20,730 
SME Scheme  
   No. of firms claiming Firm 5,153 5,855 6,570 7,354 8,238 9,921 - 
   Avg. qual. R&D expenditure £ (nom) 257,752 268,904 266,730 244,854 263,811 258,541 - 
   Avg. estimated Exchequer costs £ (nom) 39,433 42,150 41,018 44,099 43,138 43,451 - 
Large Company Scheme 
   No. of firms claiming Firm 1,290 1,592 1,776 1,795 1,923 2,092 - 
   Avg. qual. R&D expenditure £ (nom) 4,926,939 4,616,811 5,120,979 4,435,308 4,508,202 4,357,442 - 
   Avg. estimated Exchequer costs £ (nom) 371,097 346,616 412,088 376,405 382,284 357,870 - 
SME subcontractors 
   No. of firms claiming Firm 399 443 522 610 720 715 - 
   Avg. qual. R&D expenditure £ (nom) 630,098 465,590 406,302 504,624 658,942 928,208 - 
   Avg. estimated Exchequer costs £ (nom) 47,406 48,014 43,043 42,618 46,771 56,809 - 
Patenting 
   No. of firms having patents Firm 3,093 3,085 2,965 2,806 2,682 2,662 9,420 
   Avg. number of patents  Patent 2.68 2.77 2.72 2.63 2.66 2.64 4.93 
   No. of firms having UK patents Firm 3,262 3,316 3,228 3,083 2,989 2,965 - 
   Avg. number of UK patents Patent 3.00 3.08 3.00 2.83 2.78 2.82 - 
   No. of firms having EPO patents Firm 1,453 1,448 1,376 1,409 1,358 1,125 - 
   Avg. number of EPO patents Patent 0.95 0.90 0.82 0.83 0.47 0.17 - 
Panel B. Full FAME dataset 
Unit 2006 2007 2008 2009 20210 2011 2006-11 
No. of firms Firm 1,780,531 1,858,209 1,870,089 1,898,721 1,973,722 2,073,930  3,140,060 
Variable coverage 
   No. of firms with total assets Firm 1,732,169 1,807,743 1,818,448 1,843,896 1,914,848 2,015,058 - 
   Total assets coverage % 97.3% 97.3% 97.2% 97.1% 97.0% 97.2% - 
   No. of firms with sales Firm 352,680 319,726 275,938 274,768 263,394 227,463 - 
   Sales coverage % 19.8% 17.2% 14.8% 14.5% 13.3% 11.0% - 
   No. of firms with employment Firm 95,615 93,855 91,375 94,332 98,426 97,814 - 
   Employment coverage % 5.4% 5.1% 4.9% 5.0% 5.0% 4.7% - 
Panel C. CT600 and FAME matching 
Unit 2006 2007 2008 2009 20210 2011 2006-11 
# of CT600 firms that appear in 
FAME between 2006 and 2011 
Firm 1,353,844 1,427,132 1,442,619 1,468,000 1,529,317 1,598,012  2,358,948 
As share of CT600 firm count % 96.2% 96.0% 97.2% 97.5% 97.7% 97.0% 94.5% 
Out of which 
   # of firms claiming tax relief Firm 6,411 7,409 8,298 9,105 10,108 11,937 20,627 
   As share of CT600 R&D firms % 99.7% 99.7% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6% 99.5% 99.5% 
   # of firms having patents Firm 3,078 3,065 2,951 2,789 2,665 2,634 9,376 
  As share of CT600 patenting firms % 99.5% 99.4% 99.5% 99.4% 99.4% 98.9% 99.5% 
Note: Average qualifying R&D expenditure and estimated Exchequer costs are calculated for corresponding R&D-tax-relief 
claiming firms. Average number of patents, UK patents, and EPO patents are calculated for corresponding patenting firms. 
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Figure A1. Discontinuities in average R&D expenditure over 2009-11 at “pseudo” SME asset thresholds 
Note: Discontinuity estimate at each placebo threshold is estimated using the baseline first-stage R&D expenditure 
regression (OLS Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with average R&D expenditure over 2009-11 as the 
dependent variable).The running variable is total assets in 2007. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 
2007 €25m above and below the placebo threshold. Controls for first order polynomials of running variable 
separately for each side of the placebo threshold are included. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval 
for the discontinuity estimates.   
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Figure A2. Discontinuities in average number of patents over 2009-11 at “pseudo” SME asset thresholds 
Note: Discontinuity estimate at each placebo threshold is estimated using the baseline reduced-form R&D 
expenditure regression (OLS estimates based on the RD design with average number of patents over 2009-11 as the 
dependent variable).The running variable is total assets in 2007. Baseline sample includes firms with total assets in 
2007 €25m above and below the placebo threshold. Controls for first order polynomials of running variable 
separately for each side of the placebo threshold are included. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval 
for the discontinuity estimates. 
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Figure A3. McCrary tests for no manipulation at the SME asset threshold, year-by-year 
Note: McCrary tests for discontinuity in distribution density of total assets at the SME asset threshold of €86m, 
year-by-year for 2006, 2009, 2010, and 2011. Each sample includes firms with total assets in [€46m, €126m] in the 
respective year. The discontinuity estimate (log difference in density height at the SME threshold) (standard error) 
in 2006 is 0.029 (0.065), in 2009 is -0.125 (0.078), in 2010 is -0.006 (0.077), and in 2011 is -0.086 (0.075).  
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Figure A4. McCrary test for no manipulation at the SME asset threshold before the policy change 
Note: McCrary test for discontinuity in distribution density of total assets at the SME asset threshold of €86m before 
the policy change, pooling together total assets in 2006 and 2007. Sample includes firms with total assets in [€46m, 
€126m] in each of the year. The discontinuity estimate (log difference in density height at the SME threshold) is 
0.013, with standard error of 0.056. 
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Figure A5. McCrary test for no manipulation at the SME asset threshold after the policy change 
Note: McCrary test for discontinuity in distribution density of total assets at the SME asset threshold of €86m after 
the policy change, pooling together total assets in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Sample includes firms with total assets in 
[€46m, €126m] in each of the year. The discontinuity estimate (log difference in density height at the SME 
threshold) is -0.072, with standard error of 0.045. 
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Figure A6. Number of firms with binding and not-binding asset and revenue thresholds 
Note: Asset threshold is not binding for firms with 2007 sales in (€20m, €100m] and binding for firms with 
2007 sales in (€100m, €180m]. Sales threshold is not binding for firms with 2007 total assets in (€6m, €86m] 
and binding for firms with 2007 total assets in (€86m, €166m]. 
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